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CORPORATIONS AND EXPRESS TRUSTS
AS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS?“
A dvantages’

Claimed.

BUTLER of Columbia University is reported to
an address before the New York Chamber of
Commerce in I911, that “the limited liability corporation is the
greatest single discovery of modern times, whether you judge it by
its social, by its ethical, by its industrial, or, in the long run—
after we understand it and know how to use it,-—by its political,

PRESIDENT
have said in

effects.“
In 1912, in a paper submitted to the Tax Commissioner of Massa
chusetts, Alfred D. CHANDLER, of the Boston Bar, said “Express
Trusts, whether created under wills, deeds of settlement, assign
ments _for the beneﬁt of creditors, receiverships, or by special dec
larations of trust, to manage property or carry on business, are
neither corporations nor joint stock companies, nor partnerships,
but they employ a distinct and the highest known method of admin
istration.””
The latest Statistical Abstract shows that in 1913, there were in
the United States 305,336 corporations, with over $96,000,000,000
of stock and bonds, with an income of over $3,800,o0o,000, and pay
ing a tax to the Federal government of over $35,000,000.
The
stock and bonds together represent nearly or quite two thirds of
the wealth of the whole country. In 4 years, 1909-1913, the number
of corporations increased over 40,000, and the stock and bonds over
$12,ooo,oo0,o0o.“
" Address before the North
Dakota State Bar Association, Sept. 17, 1914.
Government and the Corporations, by Francis Lynde Stetson, no At]. M.,
p. 27, 32 (July, 1912) quoting from Pres. Butler.
‘Express Trusts under the Common Law, by Alfred Chandler, p. 26. Little,
Brown & Co. 1912.
‘United States Statistical Abstract, 1913, p. 600.

‘The

§‘

Z
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In conservative Massachusetts in the five years, 1907-1911, about
6,500 corporations were created; and during the same period over
4,000 were dissolved by the legislature.
In 1911, it was reported
that 4,000 California corporations would be dissolved for failure to
pay a license tax, and 4,000 more in Missouri for failure to file the
annual anti-trust statement.
This shows an extraordinary mortality
among corporations in these states."
In

Express Real Estate Trusts in Boston alone owned
of property and there had been no deaths among 17 of
them in 14 years."
In 1905, President SIMMONs of the Fourth National Bank in
New York, and of the New York Stock Exchange, said: “The exten
sion of the principle of incorporation has enabled leaders in business
to set up two standards of morality, to maintain a Jekyll and Hyde
duality, and to do as members of an impersonal and non-moral cor
porate body acts which they would shrink from as individuals.
In
private life they are stainless, but in the interests of corporations,
* * * they will have recourse to every villainy damned in the
decalogue.”
And in 1910, President WILSON, in his address be
fore the American Bar Association pleaded “earnestly for the indi
vidualization of responsibility within the corporation, for the estab
lishment of the principle of law that a man has no more right to
do wrong as a member of a corporation than as an individual.”
1912,

$250,000,000

On the other hand to quote MAITLAND, “It is said—and appeal is
made to long experience,—that men are more conscientious when
they are doing acts in their own names than when they are using the
name of a corporation.” “A very high degree not only of honesty,
but of diligence has been required of trustees.”
“No higher stand
ards of administrative conduct are evoked by Courts than those
which trusts

require.”

Special Advantages of Corporations.

The advantages of incorporation have long been recognized and
frequently referred to in the literature of our law. More than six
hundred years ago, BRACTON said: “If an abbot, or prior * * *
* Chandler, Express Trusts, p. 10, and Supplement.
* Report of Tax Commissioner (Wm. D. T. Trefry), Mass. 1912, p. 18. Chandler,
Express Trusts, p. 11.
* As quoted by Chandler, Express Trusts, p. 20, from the New York Daily Tribune,
Oct. 7, 1905.
* The Lawyer and the Community, Am. Bar Assn. Rep., 1910, pp. 419, 438.
* Maitland, Trust & Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 362.
* Ib., p. 352.
Chandler Express Trusts, p. 24.

*

--3?
claim land in the name of their church upon the seisin of their pre
decessors * * * the declaration should not be from abbot to abbot,
or prior to prior, nor should there be mention of the intermediate
abbots or priors, because in colleges and in chapters the same cor
poration always remains, although they all die successively and
others are substituted in their place, as may be said of ﬂocks of
where there is always the same ﬂock, although all the
sheep,
sheep or heads successively depart, nor does any individual of them
succeed to another by right of succession in such manner that the
right descends by inheritance from one to another, because the
right always pertains to the church, and remains with the church.
* * And accordingly
if the abbot or the prior, the monks or
canons successively die, the house remains to eternity.”“
BLACKSTONE writing ﬁve centuries later than BRACTON, and at the
very beginning of the application of science and invention to indus
trial conditions, in anything like modern ways, says in summing up
the corporation
law of his time :—

"To show the advantages of these incorporations, let us consider
the case of a college in either of our universities, founded ad stu
dendum et orandum, for the encouragement and support of relig
If this were a mere voluntary assembly, the
ion and learning.
individuals which compose it might indeed read, pray, study, and
perform scholastic exercises together, so long as they could agree
to do so; but they neither frame, nor receive any laws or rules of
of their conduct; none at least which would have any binding force,
for want of coercive power to create a sufficient obligation.
Neither
could they be capable of retaining any privileges or immunities;
for, if such privileges be attacked, which of all this unconnected
And, when
assembly has the right, or ability, to defend them?
they are dispersed by death or otherwise, how shall they transfer
these advantages to another set of students, equally unconnected
So, also, with regard to holding estates or other
as themselves?
property, if land be granted for the purposes of religion or learning
to twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no legal way of con
tinuing the property to any other persons for the same purposes,
but by endless-conveyances from one to the other, as often as the
hands are changed. But when they are consolidated and united into
they and their successors are then
jrerson in law; as one person, they have one will,
from the sense of the majority of the individuals;
establish rules and orders for the regulations of
a corporation,

"

Bracton,

Treatise

on Laws of England,

(c. 1264), Vol.

considered as one
which is collected
this one will may
the whole, which

5, Twiss’s

Ed., pp. 447-449.
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are a sort of municipal laws of this little republic; or rules and
statutes may be prescribed to it at its creation, which are then in the
place of natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the estates and
possessions, of the corporation, when once vested in them, will be
forever vested, without any new conveyance to new successions; for
all the individual members that have existed from the foundation to
the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person
in law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river Thames
is still the same river, though the parts which compose it are chang
ing every instant.”
In 1819 Chief Justice MARSHALL put it this way: “A corporation
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con
templation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon
very existence. These are
either expressly
incidental
such
are supposed best calculated
effect the object for which
Among the most important are immortality, and,
was created.
allowed, individuality: properties
the expression may
which
perpetual succession
many persons are considered
the same,
single, individual.
They enable
corporation
and may act
manage its own affairs and
hold property without the perplexing
intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity
perpetual convey
purpose
transmitting
ances for the
from hand
hand.
chiefly for the purpose
clothing the bodies
men
succession
with those qualities and capacities that corporations were invented
perpetual succession
and are
use. By these means
individuals
capable
acting
promotion
are
for the
the particular object, like
one immortal being.”
Express

Trusts.
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Ch. 18, Of Corporations.
Woodward, (1819),
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Mass., 1912,
21.
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Upon the other hand the special advantages
Express Trusts
have recently been stated
follows:"
(1) These associations have been found
the experience
twenty-five years
convenient, safe and unobjectionable meth
coöperative ownership and management.
od
manage
organization ensures
continuity
(2) The form
ment and control which appeals strongly
investors
real estate,
corporation with changing officers.
which cannot
secured
The trustees who are the managing officers
trust are not
likely
changed
corporation.
are the directors
(17 U. S.)

518.
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(3) It affords a more economical and more convenient and flex
ible form of management than does a corporation.
Trustees can
transact business with more ease and rapidity than directors.
“In the early development of uses a device was struck upon that
gave permanence as well as relief from the various feudal burdens.
This was the joint tenancy. An owner will convey his land to a
party of friends, to hold as joint tenants.
“There will then be no
By keeping up the
inheritance, and no relief, wardship, marriage.
joint
tenants,
by
refeoffment,
wall of
feoffment and
he can keep
out the lord and can reduce the chances of reliefs and so forth to
nothing.” There is here no inheritance, only accrescence."
Mr. MATLAND names “a few typical instances of unincorporated
bodies” that have lived behind the trustee wall for long periods of
years.” He says “Imagine a foreign tourist, with Baedeker in hand
visiting one of our ‘Inns of Court, let us say Lincoln's Inn. He
sees the chapel and the library and the dining hall; he sees the ex
ternal gates that are shut at night. * * * On inquiring he hears of
an ancient constitution that had taken shape before 1422. * * * You
have here a Privateverein which has not even juristic personality.
* * * Its members might divide the property that is held for them
by trustees. * * * The English judges who received and repeated
a great deal of the canonistic learning about corporations * * *
were to a man members of these * * * and had never found that
the want of juristic personality was a serious misfortune."

Then there are (or were until 6 weeks ago) the ships of Com
merce carrying the name of Lloyds into all the seas of the world;
almost from the beginning there was among these insurers of the
world's commerce only a very loose organization with the exclusive
use of a coffee house, and a small trust fund, until the trust deed
of 1811 was executed with over 1,100 signatures, and until 1871
“it was an unincorporated Verein, without the least trace (at least
so we said) of juristic personality about it.” It was incorporated
in 1871, because in that year there was recovered from the Zuyder
Zee, a large mass of treasure that had been lying there since 1799,
and, because of the destruction of records by fire, it belonged to no
one could say whom.”
There is also the London Stock Exchange, beginning in 1773 when
the name was “wrote over the door” at New Johnathan's Coffee
House. “In 1802 a costly site was bought, a costly building erected,

* Maitland, Lectures
* Maitland, Trust &
* Maitland, Trust &
* Ib. pp. 371-373.

on Equity, p. 26.
Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol.
Corporation, Collected Papers, Vol.

III,
III,

p. 336.
p. 369-371.

—5—
and an elaborate constitution was formulated in “a deed of settle
ment." There was a capital of £20,000 divided into 400 shares. Be
hind the trustees stood a body of “proprietors,” who had found the
money; and behind the “proprietors” stood a much larger body of
“members” whose subscriptions formed the income that was divided
among the “proprietors.” “In I876 there was a new deed of settle
ment; in I882 large changes were made in it: there was a capital of
£240,000 divided into 20,000 shares. * * * The organization is of
* * * In
* * * recommend
a high type.
I877 a Royal Commission
ed that the Stock Exchange should be incorporated,”
and the bye
laws~be made subject to the approval of the Board of Trade.
“That
was the Cloven hoof. Ex [Jede diabolum.”
It was not incorporated,
yet l\/IAITLAND says: “it would not, I think, be easy to ﬁnd anything
that a corporation could do that is not being done by this nicht
rec/1tsfdhigc V erein” (society without legal capacity)?° The New
York Stock Exchange also is unincorporated.
MAITLAND, with his delightful humor, says again: “I believe that
in the eyes of a large number of my fellow countrymen, the most
important and august tribunal in England is not the House of
Lords but the Jockey Club. * * * Some gentlemen form a club,
buy a race course, the famous Newmarket Heath, which is con
veyed to trustees for them, and then they can say who shall and
who shall not be admitted to it. I fancy, however, that some men
who have been excluded from this sacred heath (“warned off New
Market Heath” is our phrase), would have much preferred the
major excommunication of that “historic organism” the Church of
Rome.””°

This reference to the Church justiﬁes further quotation from
MAITLAND. He says “All that we English people mean by “religious
liberty" has been intimately connected with the making of trusts.
* * * If in I688 the choice had lain between conceding no tolera
of Nonconformists,” they
tion at all and forming corporations
would have been “Untolerated for a long time to come, for in Eng
land, as elsewhere, incorporation meant privilege and exceptional
favour. And, on the other hand, there were among the Noncon—
formists many who would have thought that even toleration was
dearly purchased if their religious affairs were subjected to State

If

control. * * *
the
few persecuting laws
soon did the rest. * *
agogues and Catholic
"1b-

”Ib.

State could be persuaded * * * to repeal a
* * * Trust would do the rest * * *. Trust
* And now we have in England
Iewish Syn
cathedrals and the churches and chapels of

on 373-376
p. 376.
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They are owned by natural persons. They are
countless sects.
by
owned
trustees.”
In this way were the lands of the Methodist churches and chapels
held throughout England and the United States, under model deeds
used by John Wesley in the very beginning of his ministry to the
effect that the trustees, for the time being should permit Wesley
himself, and such other persons as he might, from time to time ap
point, to have the free use of such premises, to preach therein God's
holy word, and after his death “for the sole use of such persons as
might be appointed by the yearly conference;” these deeds were
confirmed and made perpetual under his deed of trust of 1784, es
tablishing the Methodist General Conference of IOO, and which has
been called the Magna Charta of that church.”
And although our Supreme Court has recently held, following
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, that the Roman Cath
olic Church is a corporation “which antedates by almost a thousand
years any other personality in Europe,” yet the great “organized
operative institution” known as the Established Church of England,
tracing its existence back to Theodore of Tarsus, 669 A. D. “is not
a corporate body.”
It would seem from these illustrations, that other institutions
known to the law based upon trusteeships rival in duration and per
manence the immortality of corporations.

Ex

It is my purpose to compare these two-Corporations and
press Trusts,—in such detail as my time will permit, to discover, if
perchance we may, something of the strength and weakness of each,
for business purposes, under present day conditions.
Theory of Corporate Existence.”

A recent definition by Chief Justice BALDw1N of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, says a corporation is “an association of persons to
whom the sovereign has offered a franchise to become an artificial,
* Ib. pp. 363-364.
* Life and Times of

John Wesley. by L. Tyerman, Vol. 3, p. 419; Lost Chapters
from Early History of American Methodism, by J. B. Wakeley, p. 58, where a copy of
the deed for a Methodist Preaching-house, on John Street, N. Y., dated Nov. 2, 1770,
is given.
* Tyerman, p. 421.
Barlin v. Ramirez (1906), 7 Phil. 41; Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church (1908),
21o U. S. 296; Santos v. Roman Catholic Church (1909), 212 U. S. 463.
* 3 Encyc. of Laws of England, p. 14; 2 Stephen’s Commentaries, 16th Ed. (1914),
p. 806; 11 Halsbury's The Laws of England, p. 371, Sec. 706 (Ecclesiastical Law).
* Bibliography:
Angell and Ames, Law of Private Corporations, Introduction and Ch. I. (1st Ed.
1831, and subsequent editions.)
Baldwin, S. E., History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and

*

_3—
Legal Hist., p. 236;
States, Yale Bicen. Pub. 1901, p. 261, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-Am.
Freedom of Incorporation,
(in Modern Political Institutions, 1898).
Blackstone, Sir Wm., Commentaries (1765), Bk. I, Ch. xviii.
Legal History Series,
Brissaud, J., History of French Private Law, Continental
(1912). P9- 889-905
Brown, W. Jethro, The Austinian Theory of Law, (1906), pp. 254-270; The Per
sonality of the Corporation and the State, 21 Law Quart. Rev. 365.
Carr, Cecil Thomas, Early Forms of Corporateness. Ch. IX, in General Principles
Legal Hist. (1905), p. 161;
of the Law of Corporations, 3 Select Essays, Anglo-Am.
Select Charters of Trading Companies, 1530-1707. Selden Society, Vol. 28 (1913).
Cawston and Keane, The Early Chartered Companies, 1296-1858, (1896).
Clark and Marshall, Private Corporations, Vol. I, Ch. I.
Davis, John P., Corporations, A Study of Origin and Development, (1905); Nature
of Corporations, 12 Polit. Science Quar. 273.
Deiser, George F., The Juristic Person, 57 Am. Law Reg. (O. S.) 131, (1908).
Elliot, C. B., Private Corporations, Ch. I, (1897).
Evans, F., The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Trading Company, 8 Colum
bia L. R. 339, 461 (1908); What is a company? 26 Law Quart. Rev. 259-263.
Freund, E., Legal Nature of Corporations, University of Chicago Studies in Polit
ical Science.
Geldart, W. M., Legal Personality, 27 Law Quart. Rev., 90 (1910).
Gierke, O., Political Theories of Middle Ages, tr. by F. W. Mvaitland (1913), In
troduction pp. viii-xliii, 67-73, with notes.
Holdsworth, W. S., History of English Law, Vol. 3, pp. 362-376.
Johnson, A. B., Legislative History of Corporations in New York, 20 Hunt's Mer
chant's Magazine, 610 (1850).
Kent, James, Commentaries, (1827), Vol. II, Lect. 33.
Kyd, S., Corporations
(1793), Introduction.
Macheu, A. W. Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. Law Rev., (1911), pp. 253, 347.
Maitland, F. Wt, The Crown as Corporation, 3 Coll. Pap. pp. 244-270; The Unin
corporated Body, Ib., pp. 271-284; The Body Politic, Ib., pp. 285-303; Moral Person
ality and Legal Personality, Ib., pp. 304-320; Trust and Corporation, Ib., pp. 321-404.
See also 14 Journal Comp. Leg., p. 192.
Manson E, Evolution of the Private Company, 26 Law Quart. Rev., pp. 11-16.
Merritt, W. W., Some Views of the Nature and Eﬁect of Corporateness, 10 Mich.
Law Rev., p. 310 (1912).
Luigi, Comparative Legal Philosophy, (Vol.
Miraglia,
Modern Legal Philos
ophy Series, tr. by John Lisle, 1912), Ch.
Incorporeal
Persons, pp. 361-381.
Moore, J. H., Development of Corporation Law in this Country, Ark. Bar Assn.
Rein (1909), PP- 45-8!
Morawetz, V., Private Corporations, Preface, 2d Ed. (1886).
to Year Book, 16 Ed.
Pike, L. 0., Introduction
part I, p.xlvi.
Pollock, Sir F., Contracts, 6th Ed., 108; 7th Ed., 113; Has the Common Law Re
ceived the Fiction Theory of Corporations?
27 Law Quart. Rev. 219 (1911).
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, pp. 469-511, 660-688.
Radin, Max, Legislation of Greeks 81 Romans on Corporations
(1909).
Rashdall, H., The Universities
and the Legislature,
29 Law Quart. Rev., 76-84

III,

III,

III,

(1913)
Raymond, R. L., The Genesis of a Corporation, 19 Harv. Law Rev. 350 (1906).
Salmond, J. W., Jurisprudence, Ch. XV, (3d Ed. 1910).
Scott, W. R., Constitution and Finance of English & Irish Joint Stock Companies
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Seymour, E. B., History of the Common Law Conception of a Corporation, 42 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.), 1902, p. 529.
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#91
juridical person, with

a name of its own, under which they can act
and contract, and sue and be sued, and who have accepted the offer
and effected an organization
in substantial conformity with its
terms.””’

There are three fundamental ideas l1ere: A corporation is -a new
person in the law resulting from the acceptance of a franchise to
become such, by an association of persons.
The ﬁrst of these,—that a corporation is a person,“ separate from
its members, has already been referred to as its chief characteristic
and advantage. This idea of the personality and unity of a group
is not new but old, almost as old as language.
We are told nowa
days that the primitive mind of man had a more deﬁnite and positive
idea of the unity and solidarity of the horde, or pack, or clan or
tribe of savage hunters and warriors, than it had of the personality
of its individual members.”
Among all the Aryan peoples,—Hindu, Greek, Roman, Teuton,
or Slav,—the oldest artiﬁcial person seems to have been the fam
ily.“ The Ancient Egyptians and Babylonians personiﬁed the Tem
ple.“ Long before JUSTINIAN all the members of a corporation were
considered one person or body in the Roman Law.”
The canonists of the 13th century call it a persona ﬁcta, not
found in the world of sense, but created by law, invisible, immortal,
a body that has no body and no soul; it cannot sin, or be excom
Sutton’s Hospital Case, 10 Coke Rep., pp. 1-35 (1613).
Taylor, I-I. O., Private Corporations,
Prelaces, and Chs. I-IV. (1884 and subse
quent editions).
Trapnell,
Benj., The Logical
Conception
of a Corporation,
West Virginia Bar
Assn. Report 1896, Appendix to Clark on Corporations, 1st Ed., p. 643.
,
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518.
Cases,
L.,
H.
with
Wilgus,
Corporation
pp. 1-167
notes (1900).
Williston, Samuel, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800, 2
Harv. Law Rev., 105, 149 (1888), 3 Select Essays Anglo-Am.
Legal Hist. p. 195.
Wormser, I. M., Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912), 12 Col. Law Rev.
496.

Wright, A. G., The California

91. (1913).
Young.

State Tax on Corporate

Franchises,

1 Cal. Law Rev.

22 Law Quart. Rev.
E. H., Legal Personality of a Foreign Corporation,
Foreign Companies and Other Corporations, Cambridge University
Press,
178 (1906).
1912.
(The foregoing bibliography includes only such works as contain important matter
relating to corporate theory or history.)
"Mackay v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (1909), 82 Conn. 73, 81, 72 Atl. 583.
“See particularly in bibliography given in note 26 above, Blackstone. Brissaud,
Brown, Carr, Deiser, Freund, Geldart, Gierke, Machen, Maitland,
Miraglia,
Pike, Pol
lock, Salmond, Seymour, Sohm, Wilgus.
"Morawetz, § 1, p. 2.
"Hearn, The Aryan Household, pp. 64-6.
"Johns, C. H. W., Babylonian & Assyrian Laws, Contracts & Letters, Ch. XX
Vol. I, pp. 171-179.
(1904); Simcox, E. J., Primitive Civilizations,
Amos, Sheldon, History and Principles of Civil Law of Rome, p. 118.

"

municated, nor commit a crime, and probably not a tort.“ Early in
the 14th century these words were being repeated in the year books
of English law by the English judges. In I311 it was considered
a body (un corps), existing per se, and not appendant or appurte
nant to something else.“ And only a short time ago Mr. Justice
MCKENNA, of the United State Supreme Court said “Undoubtedly
a corporation is in law, a person or entity entirely distinct from its
stockholders and ofﬁcers.”‘“‘ It is such, for the most part, in rela
tion to outside parties; it has rights of property and reputation, and
is subject to general duties under the common law and statutes;
and is also considered a person as to ownership of property, and
suing and being sued, and in considerable measure it is so under
the protection of constitutional and treaty provisions.“

The second of these,—that a corporation results from the accept
of a franchise“ from the state,—although now so frequently

ance

criticized or belittled, historically has been as important as the per
In fact in legal theory, the privilege,
sonality of the corporation.
the franchise itself, is the capacity of separate personality, conferred
The legal ideas involved come from the Roman
upon the group.
and from the Feudal law. From the Roman, the franchise is a priv
ilege of a public nature conferred by the state for political or public
reasons.
Anciently perhaps in Greece and Rome groups of per
sons were associated without authority of the state, and acted much
as a single person; but the Romans were jealous of such and many
laws were made against illicit companies between the Twelve Tables
(450 B. C.) and the Empire; Caesar and Augustus did the same;
and in the time of Gaius, and Marcian, corporations could be cre
ated only under special or general legislative authority."

The

Political theory of corporate existence prevailed in the
“The corporation is and must be the creature of the
state.
Into its nostrils the state must breathe the breath of ﬁctitious
life, for otherwise it would be no animated body but individualistic
In the Year Books of our law in I376, it was ruled that
dust.”3"
same

middle ages.

5‘ Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, p. 477. Note Wilgus’s Cases, pp. 72-79.
5‘ Y. B., 4 Ed. II, 103; Y. B., 16 Ed.
Pike's Introduction.
"McCaskill Co. v. U. S. (1910), 216 U. S. 504, 514. And Cave, _T., In re Sheﬁield
etc. Society (1889), says “A corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual."
L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 470 on 476.
“See Cases, Wilgus, Corp. Cases, pp. 33-72.
“See bibliography in note 26 above, particularly, Blackstone. Gierke, (Maitland’s
pp. xxxi-xxxviii), Kent, State Trials, Trustees Dart. Coll. v. Woodward
tr. Introduc.,
(Washington‘s
Opinion),
Wilgus, (Corp. Cases, pp. 113-170), Wright.
"Kent, Comm., Vol. 2, pp. 268-9; Taylor's El. Civil Law, pp. 567-57:; Digest,
xlvii, 22, 1 and 3 (Marcian); Digest, iii, 4, 1 (Gains).
3“Maitland's Summary, in Gierke's Pol. Th. of Mid. Ages, p. xxx.
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“none but the king can make a corporation.”
And as we all know
with us today “the right to form a private corporation can only be
acquired from the state.”
From the Feudal law this privilege was not merely a personal priv
ilege, but was looked upon as a privilege of a property kind. The
Medieval mind had a peculiar tendency to look upon all sorts of
immaterial or incorporeal things and privileges as property; as for
example, the right of advowson. Feudal rights and incidents, too
intangible to be called holdings, were yet considered property in the
Medieval law.” In 1691 it was said “the whole frame and essence
of the corporation consist” of the franchises which are “the liga
ments of this body politic.” CoMYNs says in 1740, “A corporation
is a franchise created by the king.” BLACKSTONE and KENT say the

same.
Such a view is not dead nor sleepeth yet. It was the real
basis of Mr. Justice WASHINGTON's decision in the Dartmouth Col
lege case." In 1887, Mr. Justice BRADLEY said: “A franchise is a
right of public concern. * * * No persons can make themselves a
body corporate and politic without legislative authority. Corporate
capacity is a franchise.”
Ten years ago the Supreme Court of
California said “The right to be and exist as a corporation is a
grant by the sovereign power, a valuable right” and subject to taxa
tion." And just the other day it was said: “A corporate franchise
is the right to exist as an entity for the purpose of doing things per
mitted by law.” And the exercise of such right is subject to taxa

tion.*
The third of these, -that a corporation is really an association or
collection of individuals, is strongly insisted upon by Mr. Morawetz
and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Morawetz says: It is “essential to bear in mind
an

of

it,

distinctly that the rights and duties of an incorporated association,
are in reality, the rights and duties of the persons who compose
imaginary being.” And Mr. Taylor: There are “two
not
Y. B., 49 Ed.
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Mackey (1912), 255 Ill. 144, 156, 99 N.
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London, Carthew, 217;
Show. 275-6.
*4 Wheat. 518 on 657, (1819).
California
Central Pacific Ry. Co., 127 U.
40.
City
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California
Co.
San Francisco (1904), 142 Cal. 276, 1oo Am.
130, 75 Pac. 832; Crocker
Scott, 149 Cal. 575,
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Pac. 89; Western Union
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Los Angeles (1911), 161 Cal. 204, 118 Pac. 721; Farr Alpaca Co.
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(1912), 212 Mass. 156. Compare Detroit &c. Ry. Co.
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Mich. 673, 84 Am. St.
(1908), 34 Utah 369, 98 Pac. 18o; Cooper
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oz Pac. 202. See
Cal. Law Rev.
(1913).
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Business Men's Assn. (1914), — Mo. App.,
163
W. 901.
People
Sohmer (1914), 147 N. Y.
611.
Corp.
227-231;
Morawetz Private
2d Ed. Preface and
See Note Wilgus
p. 110.
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meanings of the term corporation; the one, the sum of legal rela
tions subsisting in respect to the corporate enterprise; the other the
organic body of shareholders, whose acts cause the operation of the
rules of law in the constitution.
These two conceptions include
all that is really connoted by the term in whatever sense used. And,
if so, what has become of the venerable ‘legal person’? Is he still
somewhere, as he has aways been imagined?
Or is he nowhere as
he has always actually been? Shall we say he is the combination,
the mystic uniﬁcation of our two conceptions?
Better not; better

forget

l1im."5°

Tlneory of the Trust.“
Trusts of course are the creation of the English courts of
As MA1T1.ANo says, “Of all the exploits of equity the
equity.
largest and most important is the invention and development of the
'“’Taylor, Private Corp., Preface, §§ 48-51. Sec Note Wilgus Cases, p. 111.
‘1 Bibliography:
'- Ames, ]. B., The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 Harv. Law Rev., 261-274 (1908),
2 Select Essays Anglo-Am. Legal Hist. 737-752, Lectures on Legal History, pp. 233, 243.
Cases on Trusts (1893).
Chandler, A. D., Express Trusts under Common Law (1912).
Cook, W. W., Law of Private Corporations, 7th Ed., Vol. 2, § 622 (1913).
Cook, Prof. W. W., The Place of Equity in Our Legal System, Am. Bar. Ass'n
Rept. 1912, pp. 997-1009, 3 Am. L. S. Rev. 173.
Conyngton, Thomas, Corporate Organization,
Ch. XLIII, pp. 362-374.
Fletcher, Charles, Essay on Estates of Trustees (1835).
Fonblanque, ]., Treatise on Equity (1805), Book II, Chs. 1-8.
Gager, E. B., History of Equity in American Colonies and States, in two Centuries
of Growth of American Law, (Yale Univ. Studies, 1901).
Gilbert, G., Law of Uses and Trusts, (3d Ed. 1811 Sugden).
Hampson, Sir G. F., Liabilities of Trustees, and Indemnity allowed them by Courts
of Equity (1830).
, Hart, W. G., The place of trust in jurisprudence (1912), 28 Law Quart. Rev. 29o.
Hill, James, Law Relating to Trustees (1846, and subsequent editions).
1-Iogg, J. E., Legal Estate in English Property Law (1910), 22 Jurid. Rev. 55-9.
Hohfeld, W. N., Relation between Equity and Law (1913), 11 Mich. Law Rev.
537 et seq.
Holmes, O. W. ]r., Early English Equity, 1 Law Quart. Rev. (1885), pp. 162-174,,
Leg. Hist. 705.
2 Select Essays Anglo-Am.
Jenks, Edward, The Legal Estate, 24 Law Quart. Rev. (1908), pp. 147-156.
of Court of Chancery
Kerley,
Sketch of Equity Jurisdiction
D. M., Historical
(1890)
Kenneson, T. D., Cases on Trusts (1911).
Lewin, Thomas, Law of Trusts and Trustees (1839, and subsequent editions).
Loring, A. P., Trustees Handbook (311 Ed. 1907).
- Maitland, F. W., Equity (1910-13); Trust and Corporation, 3 Coll. Papers, 321-404.
Newbold, D. M., Notes on Introduction
of Equity ]uris. in Maryland
1634-1720
(1906).
Page, T. N., Disappearance of ﬁduciary principle, 16 Am. Law Rev. 247, 302 (1908).
Perry, J. W., Treatise on Law of Trusts and Trustees, (1872 and later editions).
Pike, L. O., Common Law and Conscience, 1 Law Quart. Rev. (1885), 443-454;
Leg. Hist., 722.
2 Select Essays Anglo-Am.
Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law, Vol. I, p. 520; Vol. II, pp. 228-239.
Robinson, C., History of High Court of Chancery, Vol. I (1882).
Sanders, F. W., Essay on Uses and Trusts (1791, and later editions).
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Trust. It is an institute of great elasticity and generality; as elastic,
as general as contract.”
Our trust is refined from the doctrine of uses as they were
established in our law before the Statute of Uses.”
The older
fidei-commissa,
writers traced uses to the Roman
introduced in

it,

the Roman law, 170 years B. C. to evade the laws prohibiting the
appointing of a daughter, stranger or an exile as an heir. The
testator devised his property to a qualified citizen as his heir, uni
versal devisee, or executor, with a request, by precatory words,
depending only on the good faith or honor, strong in the Roman
breast, of such heir to restore or hand over the inheritance, or a

a

a

of

of

to

or

to

to of

part of
the designated person. To secure the enforcement
request
appealed
the
the testator implored
the Emperor,
AUGUSTUs, who flattered by such appeal, on the advice
com
jurisconsults, made these requests obligatory, under the
mittee
direction of the Consuls; and later under MARCUS AURELIUS,
enforce them, acting extra ordinem.”
POLLOCK and MAITLAND, doubt the direct
descent
our doctrine
uses and trust from this Roman origi
nal,” mainly because different terms were used
our early law.
They say, however, that “The Frank
Salica,
the Lex
(475 A.D.)
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Later writers, such

1

of

in

1

1

of

in

5

in

p.

H.

T.

p.

G.

A.

4,

I

2d

p.

II,

*

p.

p.

of

§§

I,

p.

* **

,

H.

as

in

E.

of

2

S.

of

J.

of

R.

of

p.

13

A

et of

to

of

to

-

of

of

-

J.

as

et

p.

in

Scrutton, T. S., Roman Law Influence
Chancery,
Select Essays Anglo-Am.
Legal Hist.,
seq.
208
Sears,
H., Trust Estates
Business Companies (1912).
Spence, George, Equitable Jurisdiction
Chancery (1846).
the Court
Massachusetts, Report on Voluntary Ass'ns (1912); also Re
Tax Commissioner
port
Special Commission
investigate voluntary associations
Massachusetts (1913).
(No. 1788 House.)
Jnderhill, A., Law Relating
Private Trusts and Trustees (1896).
Veeder, V. V.,
Century
English Judicature,
Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg
Hist.,
730,
seq.
Green Bag, 23
Whitlock, A. N., Classification
Trusts,
the Law
Cal. Law Rev. 215 (1913).Willoughby,
M. P., The Legal Estate (1912), Cambridge Univ. Press.
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W., Duties and Responsibilities
Trustees (1827).
Wilson,
D., Courts
Chancery
the American Colonies, 28 Am. Law Rev.
(1884), pp. 226-255,
Select Essays Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist. 779.
H., History
Woodruff,
Chancery
Massachusetts,
Law Quart. Rev. 37o
(1889).
Equity,
Of course much will be found
the standard works on
not mentioned above
such
Abbott's Cases (1909), Adams (1850 and later editions), Beach (1892), Bispham
(1878 and later editions), Eaton (1906), Hutchins and Bunker's Cases (1902), Langdell
(1904), Pomeroy (1881 and later editions), Smith,
(1908), Snell,
(13th
Ed. 1901), Story (1836 and later editions).
Maitland, Lectures on Equity, p. 23.
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24.
Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction,
"435, Kent, Com., Vol.
Vol.
*289.
813-818; Roby, Roman Private Law, Vol.
Bernard's First Year
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356.
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32; Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law,
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is already employing it; by the intermediation of a third person,
whom he puts in seisin of his lands and goods, he succeeds in ap
pointing or adopting an heir.”5° MAITLAND ﬁnds the same thing in
the Lombard law. He says: “The Lombard cannot make a genuine
testament. He therefore transfers the whole or some part of his
property to a Treiihander, who is to carry out his instructions.”“
Mr. Justice HOLMES says that “The feoffee to uses of the
early English law, corresponds point by point to the Salman
of the early German law. * * * The Salman, like the feoffee, was
a person] to whom land was transferred
in order that he might
make a conveyance according to his grantor’s directions, * * *
usually after the grantor’s death, the grantor reserving the use of
the land himself during his life. To meet the chance of the Sal
man’s death before the time for the conveyance over, it was com
mon to employ more\ than one, and persons of importance were
The essence of the relation was the fiducia
selected for the ofﬁce.
or trust reposed in the ﬁdelis manus, who sometimes conﬁrmed his
obligation by an oath or covenant. * * * The executor of the
early German will was simply a Salman whose duty it was to see
legacies and so forth paid if the heirs refused. * * * There can
be no doubt of the identity of the continental executor and the
officer of the same name described by GLANVILLE (1180) ; and thus
the connection between the English and the German law is made

certain.“
“The beneﬁciary had however no action to compel the perfor
mance of the duty of the continental Salman,”“° and “the transform
ation of the honorary obligation of the feoffee into a legal obliga
tion was a purely English development/’“° This duty was enforced
against executors in the case of bequests of personal property, in
the ecclesiastical courts, and possibly to some extent in the case of
lands devisable by custom in some of the cities.“

For

a long time even before the Conquest

the term use had been
a

a

is

(i.

in use, but yet as MAITLAND wittily says, it has “mistaken its own
e.
origin.” The word is not the Latin “usus”
using of
thing), but the Latin opus. From the 7th and 8th centuries, ad' op-us,
for “on his behalf,”
found in Lombard and Frank documents;
‘" Trust

1

3

and Corporations,
Coll. Papers, p. 327.
Early Eng. Equity,
Law Quart. Rev. 162-174 (1885); Select Essays
Anglo-Am. Leg. Hist., Vol. 2, p. 705. Maitland, Equity, p. 26.
Origin of Uses, p. 237.
Note 4, Ames, Lectures on Legal History,
Select
Leg. Hist., 737 et seq.
Essays Anglo-Am.
"Ames, Lectures on Legal Hist. p. 237.
“Ames, Ib., p. 235; Holmes, Early Eng. Equity,
Select Essays Anglo-Am.
Leg.
TIist., pp. 71o-714.

"Holmes

2

2

"

__ I5

__.

in the Old French these become “al oes, ues,” which the English
tongue, confused with “use.” The Latin records however read ad
opus;-ad opus fohannis, i. e. on behalf of ]ohn. As far back as
Domesday Book, one person is constantly doing things ad opus an
one is
other; the Sheriff seizes “ad opus Regis, as 0s le Roy/"‘”
going on a crusade he occasionally conveyed his land to another
to be held to the use of his children, or his wife or sister, for he
was not certain whether a woman could hold a military fee, or
So too, a man might want to
whether he could enfeotf his wife.
give his property to a convent, to the use of the library, or the
And when the Franciscan friars came as missionaries to
hospital.
the English towns, about 1225, with their rule forbidding them to
own anything, the faithful benefactor, who wanted to give them
in which to live and sleep, struck upon the
some poor dormitory
curious plan of conveying a house to the borough community “to
And by the
the use of,” or “as an inhabitation for” the friars.
time of BRACTON, “plots of land in London had been thus con
This was
veyed to the city for the beneﬁt of the Franciscians.”°3
in the 13th century.
In the 14th century, landowners began conveying lands to their
friends ad opus suum, to the use of themselves. Why? Because
they have found they can in effect make a will of their lands in
this way; for if A conveys his land to B to hold on behalf of A
while he lives, and then when A dies to give it to some one sug
gested by A before he dies, it is equivalent to a will. The direct
devise of lands under the feudal system had been denied to land
Men especially among the
owners for two or three centuries.
great want to provide for their daughters and younger sons.
Iohn
of Gaunt wants to provide for his illegitimate children. There were
other reasons also; to avoid the feudal burdens of wardship, mar
riage, forfeitures and escheats, the statutes of mortn1ain,—and per
haps also to defraud one’s creditors.“ Between I 396 and 1403, the
had interfered
to protect these beneﬁciaries, and is
Chancellor
ordering defendants by the writ of subpoena, “to do whatever shall
be ordained by us,” or to “do what right and good faith,” or “good
faith and conscience” demand, since the plaintiff “cannot have
remedy by the law of the Holy church nor by the common law
and one great doctrine, “Equity acts upon the person,” was taking

;°‘

If

"Maitland,

Equity, p. 24. See Note, Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law, 2d
p. 233.
“Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 2, 2d Ed., p. 231.
"Maitland, Equity, pp. 25-30.
“Ames, Lectures on Legal History, Origin of Uses, Note 3, p. 236, and note 1,

Ed., Vol.

p. 238.
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“The law regards chiefly the right of the plaintiff and gives
judgment that he recover the land, debt, or damages because they,
are his. Equity lays stress upon the duty of the defendant, and
decrees that he do or refrain from doing a certain thing because
he ought to act or forbear.”
This term ‘ad opus' in the early time was used also for what we
now use “agency.”
In the very ancient days both in France and
England, a man, such as the King's officer, will receive money not
as agent of, but to the use of, ad opus, the king, or some one else;
and in time, where the party is authorized to do some act in refer
ence to money or chattels on behalf of another, as where A's bail
iff, B, takes A's corn to market, sells
and buys cattle, ad opus
A, this develops into law
agency,
that
converts the corn
money received
cattle
his own use (ad opus suum proprium)
remedy
the common law will recognize the wrong and furnish
debt or account."
-
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land, although
was not
however
the case
looks much
contract,
certainly
like
and there
an agreement when “in con
X, Y,
conveyance made
they agree that
sideration
A, will allow him
they will hold the land for the behoof
enjoy
and will convey
he shall direct.” Why
this not
con
tract, and why did the courts not enforce it?
There are two
three reasons: (1) The feofee did not formally promise,
covenant under his seal; (2)
the 14th century the common law
had not begun
enforce the simple contract, and
the 15th
century when the simple contract began
enforced
the courts
assumpsit, the Chancellor was
common law,”
an action
jurisdiction and was already
already
possession
this field
enforcing uses
procedure far more efficient and far
means
more flexible than any which the old courts could have employed:
convey
(3) Where the promise was
directed after the death
the feoffor,
course the feoffor could not enforce
his heir
would not, for
would be
his interest not
do so;
the only
one wanting
enforce
would
the beneficiary; the court
Chancery early recognized this, and gave him the remedy, and even
the earliest instances where the trustor and the cestui que use”
“destinatory,” not
are the same, still
“author
the
trust” that he has the remedy. This marks
off from contract.
(4) Then again
the feoffor who was also the cestui que use, had
of

of p.
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231.
Eng. Law, 2d Ed., Vol. II, pp. 229, 230.
and Maitland, History
Ib.,
231.
Maitland, Equity,
28.
"On the proper use
this term, and cestui que trust, see 26 Law Quart. Rev. 196.
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only a contract right, it would be a chose in action, and inalienable,
which the landowner did not want.”
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And so what kind of a right is this which the destinatory, the
beneficiary, the cestui que use, has? Is it a right in rem or in per
sonam 2 To follow MAITLAND here: “It seems a little of both.”
“The right of cestui que use or cestui que trust begins by being a
right in personam. Gradually it begins to look somewhat like a
right in rem.” But it never has become this, no, not even in the
present day.” “The new class of rights is made to look as much
like rights in rem (estates in land) as the Chancellor can make them
look; that is in harmony with the real wish of the parties who are
using the device. They are also taking the common law as their
model. Thus we get a conversion of the use into an incorporeal
thing,-in which estates and interests exist,—a sort of immaterial
ized piece of land.” “The use came to be conceived of as a sort
of metaphysical entity in which there might be estates very similar
to those which could be created in land, estates in possession, re
mainder, reversion, estates descendible in this way or that.” But
it is “neither jus in re nor ad rem, neither right, title nor interest in
law, but a species of property unknown to the common law, and
owing
chancery, rest
existence
the equitable jurisdiction
ing upon confidence
estate;
the person and privity
was rather
hold upon the conscience
the feoffee
uses than
lien upon,
interest
the land; and the principle upon which
was founded was that the feoffee was bound
conscience
fol
low the direction of the feoffor.”
the thing, while the
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the owner, the full owner
que
cestui
trust has no rights
the thing.”
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trust res,
trust fund owned
the trustee
chancery
incorporeal thing which
the court
converted into
identity. “Today
appears
can change its dress but maintain
land; tomorrow
may
purse;
piece
some gold coins
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1113,
590,
trust,
Pac.
Pac. 1128. On the nature
V, pp. 1-77, Ch.
see particularly cases
Ames’s Cases on Trusts, Secs.
Secs.
jurisprudence (1912),
and II, Ch. II, pp. 235-278. Hart, W. G., The place
trust
N., Classification
28 Law Q. Rev. 290; Whitlock,
the law
trusts (1913),
Cal.
Law Rev. pp. 215-221.
II,
II,
"Maitland, Equity,
Cases,
pp.
235-278;
47. Ames’s
Ch.
Sec.
Kenneson's
Cases, Ch. II, pp. 111-152.
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then it will be a sum of Consols; then it will be shares in a Rail
When all is going well,
way Company; and then Peruvian Bonds.
changes of investment may often be made; the trustees have been
given power to make them. All along the ‘trust fund’ retains its
identity. * * * But the same idea is applied even when all is not
going well.”"
Mr. IVIAITLAND contends stoutly, and perhaps correctly, notwith
standing frequent loose statements to the contrary, that the bene
ﬁciary has no right in the thing, in the trust fund; the equitable
estates and interests are not jura in rem; * * * but essentially jura
in personam, not rights against the world at large but rights against
certain persons." Notwithstanding this, the beneﬁciary is treated
as having an estate in fee simple, or in fee tail, or for life in the
use or trust, or an equitable estate; or as having a term of years in
the use or trust.
These estates and interests were to devolve and
be transmitted like the analogous estates and interests known to
and protected by the common law. The equitable fee would descend
to heirs general, the equitable estates tail to heirs in tail, equitable
chattel interests would pass to the executors or administrators.
* * * The equitable estate or interest could be conveyed or as
signed inter z-ivos; and they can be devised or bequeathed; curtesy
but not dower could be had in them; they did not escheat; and they
could be reached by a creditor of the beneﬁciary.
All these look like rights in rem. Yet “the right of the cestui que
trust is the beneﬁt of an obligation,”8° and is available against not
the whole world, but only against certain persons; these are: (I)
The trustee who has undertaken to hold in trust; (2) “those who
come to the lands or goods by inheritance or succession from the
original trustee, his heir, executors, administrators, or doweress;
(3) the trustees creditors; (4) the trustees donee, who takes with
out giving a valuable consideration;
(5) the purchaser from the
trustee for value, who knows of the trust; (6) the purchaser from
the trustee who ought to know of the trust,” “who would have
known of the trust had he behaved as prudent purchasers behave,”—
according to the estimate of equity judges,-—and not of an ordinary
jury. If he did not come up to this standard he was “affected with
notice,” or had “constructive notice,” and was not protected.“
“But here a limit was reached. Against a person who acquires
a legal right bona ﬁde, for value, without notice express or con
"Maitland,
"Maitland,

Trust and Corporation, 3 Coll. Papers, pp. 350-351.
Equity, p. 112, et seq. Langdcll, Equity, pp. 5-6, 254 (2d Ed.).
"Ib., p. 116. But compare Mr. Whitlock's article in 1 Cal. Law Rev. 215, and
Classiﬁcations.
Bispham's and Pomeroy‘:
“Maitland, Equity, pp. 117-119.
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structive of the existence of equitable rights those rights are of no
avail,"—and here
the difference between the beneﬁciary's right,
and
true right in rem."
Corporations.
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of

Sutton’s Hospital, said these
Long ago, Lord COKE in the Case
“things are of the essence of
corporation:
(I) Lawful authority
of incorporation; and that may be by four means, sc. by the com
mon law, as the King himself, etc.; by authority of parliament;
The
by the King’s Charter, (as in this case) and by prescription.
2d which
of the essence of the incorporation, are parties to be in
corporated, and that in two manners, sc. persons natural, or bodies
incorporate and political.
(3) A name by which they are incor
porated, as in this case governors of the lands, etc. (4) Of
place,
for without
place no incorporation can be made; here the place
in the charter house in the County of Middlesex.
(5) By
words sufficient in law, but not restrained to any certain legal and
prescript form of words.””
as applicable and accurate
This statement, for the most part
hundred
three
was written.
We
was
years ago when
today as
the
law,—as
common
the
state
have
existing
by
corporations
yet
itself
corporation, and our governors and oﬁicers are corpora
tions sole for certain purposes, by implication or necessity.“ Public
corporations may exist with us by prescription, and private also,
where the statute of limitations runs against the state in quo war
We still have corporations in this country that
ranto proceedings."
King’s charter granted before the revolution, as
exist by virtue of
in the case of Dartmouth College.“ This method of creating cor
porations de nov0, still exists in England, but of course not with us;
and although Lord BALTIMORE, under authority conferred upon him
by the Charter of Maryland
1667 incorporated the Mayor, Re
corder, Aldermen and Common Council of the City of St. Marys,
and William PENN, by
similar provision in the Charter of Penn
charter of incorporation to the city of
sylvania, in 1701 granted
*2 Ib., p.
119.
“The Case of Sutton’s'Hospital

I.
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1
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1
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1

Wilgus Cases,
(1613) 1o Coke 1, 23a ct scq.,
p. 264.
" The Governor v. Allen (1847), Humph. (27 Tenn.) 176, Wilgus, Corp. Cages,
270, note 275.
“Greene v. Dennis (1826),
Conn. 292, 16 Am. Dec. 58,
Wilgus Cases, 275, note
278; State v. Pawtuxet Turnpike Co. (1867),
R.
521, 94 Am. Dec. 123; People v.
Doug. (Mich.) 285.
Oakland Co. Bank,
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819),
Wheat. (17 U. 5.), 518,
Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 708.
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Philadelphia," no such power now exists with us in any executive
or judicial office. And since the American revolution the power to
create corporations, with us, has resided in our legislative bodies ex
clusively.” Such power, however, when in our legislatures, is quali
ﬁed only by constitutional limitations.” And in the absence of con
stitutional provision the legislature may act by special or general
laws.
General incorporation laws probably existed at Rome.“ In
England the ﬁrst general incorporation law was enacted by Parlia
ment in I 597 for the erection of hospitals; this was made perpetual
in 1624; it is still in force, and Lord COKE, in his Second Institute
gives the act and a proper form for incorporation under it.“ The
political dogmas of the American and French revolutions, that all
men are created equal, and are entitled to equal rights, issued in the
demand for equal privileges in the formation of corporations.
To satisfy this demand and prevent the fraud and legislative job
bery incident to the granting of the privileges of incorporation by
special acts, it became the policy to incorporate under general laws.

As early as I784, general laws were passed in New York for the
incorporation of Churches; these were followed rapidly in other
In I811, New York passed the ﬁrst general incorporation
states.
law for incorporating manufacturing
This was fol
corporations.
lowed in Massachusetts in I836; in Connecticut and Michigan in
I837; and by Indiana in 1838.“
But passing general laws did not meet the whole difﬁculty,

for

continued to create corporations under special acts.
Constitutional limitations therefore became necessary. In 1821 New
York required the assent of two-thirds of the members of both
houses of its legislature.
In I838 Florida by constitutional provision forbade the incorpora
tion of churches by special act, and directed that a general law be
In 1845 Louisiana did the same for all
enacted for their creation.
the legislatures

except municipal

corporations.

In

1846

New York did likewise;

" McKim

v. Odom, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, 1 Wilgus Corp. Cas. 222; 1 Wilson's
(Andrews' Ed.), 561; Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, p. 3, note 3.
Charters Vol. 2, p. 1388, Par. 14 (North Carolina).
“Franklin Bridge C0. v. Wood (1853), 14 Ga. 80, 1 Wilgus, Corp. Cas. 279,
note 286.
wBe11 v_ Bank of Nashville (1823), Peck (7 Tenn.) 269; Penobscot Boom Corp. v.
Lamson (1839), 16 Me. (4 Shep) 224, 33 Am. Dec. 656, 1 \‘Vilgus, Corp. Cas. 283; 1
WOrl-cs, 561; Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.
Works, iii; 1 Wilson's
Hamilton's
Wm-ks,
Poore’s

1sa U. 5- 525_
"Baldwin, Modern Political Institutions, Freedom of Incorporatuon.
°‘ 39 Eliz. Ch. 5 (1597); 21 Jas. 1, Ch. 1, (1624); 2 Inst., p. 723; 6 Encyc. of Laws

(1894).

of England 233.
Laws of New York 1784, 7 Secs., Ch.
9aN0te (b) 2 Kent's Com. p. [$42].
Laws of N. Y., 1811, Ch. 67, 34 Secs. Notes 1 and 2, 1 Machen, Corp. p. 15.
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and now almost every state constitution provides that the legisla
tures shall pass no special act creating corporations or conferring
corporate powers, but all corporations shall be created under general
laws which shall be subject to amendment and repeal by the legis
lature at any time.” Mr. FROST says special charters can be granted
in only seven states."
In speaking of the general incorporation laws, Mr. MACHEN says,
“The statutes in some states consist of a jumble of old acts thrown
together almost indiscriminately with more recent amendments. In
other states, the legisatures have intended to display the utmost lib
erality; but unfortunately this disposition has often been evinced by
removing salutary restrictions and at the same time, in order to
make a show of legislative regulation, by imposing vexatious and
unreasoning restraints.”
Mr. FROST says that “a great majority of the business corporation
acts in force in this country today are sadly in need of revision.
* * * The incorporation laws of Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Mary
land are veritable “legal antiques,” * * * and the acts of many of
the states are “wonderfully and fearfully made.” And every law
yer that has tried to find out the real meaning of the corporation
statutes of a single state, knows that such mild expressions are alto
gether too euphonious to do the subject justice.
Not only are incorporation laws notoriously uncertain in mean
ing, but they are inflexible so long as they last, and when, in what
way, and to what extent, they will be changed by the legislature,
Providence only, if anyone, can tell.

Then again one must at his peril substantially comply with the
law whether he can determine its meaning or not; and in many
states if he fails so to comply he can only say some sort of disaster
will follow, exactly what under the present state of authorities, he
cannot tell, for it is concealed in gremio legis et curiae; in one place

it will be de facto existence;" in another not;" in one a full part
nership liability for members; in another an individual liability for
participants,"—but for all, even though they acted in good faith,
it will be something different from what they intended.

* Private Corporations, Wilgus, p. 118, Const. Fla. 1838, Art. 13, Sec. 1; Louis
iana Const. 1845; New York Const. 1821, Art. 7, Sec. 9; Const. 1846, Art. 8, Sec. 3.
* Frost, Incorporation and Organization of Corporations, p. 2 (4th Ed).
* Machen, Corp. p. 17.
Frost, Inc. & Organ. Corp. pp. 3, 7 (4th Ed.).
* Finnegan v. Noerenberg (1893), 52 Minn. 239, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 614.
* Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bank (1881), 56 Ia. 104, I Wilgus, Cases 607; Berge
ron v. Hobbs (1897), 96 Wis. 641, 65 Am. St. R. 85, 1 Wilgus, Cases 611.
* Martin v. Fewell (1883), 79 Mo. 401, 1 Wilgus, Cases 673, note 676.
Fay v. Noble (1851), 7 Cush. (Mass.), 188, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 677, note 681.

*
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business, term,
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subscribing for stock
not, are tenants
common
the proposed
duly subscribed
annount until
others."

or to

Then too it is difficult,
Court has passed upon

by

no

of

of

At

to

to

to

of

a

or

a

is

or

of

of

of

express trust
matter
declarant, accepted
the mere declaration
the trustor
the
trustee,
special stat
contract between them." There are
comply with except the Statute
Frauds, the Statute
utes
Uses, statutes relating
Perpetuities, and
Conveyancing and Re
cording.

is

it

Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (1869), 101 Mass. 385,
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incorrect
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Steps in Creation of Corporations.

Mr. FROST enumerates" the various steps necessary to create a
corporation under modern business corporation acts, as follows:
(1) The drafting of the articles of incorporation;
(2) The signing of the articles by the requisite number of incor
porators, and the acknowledgement of the same before an officer
duly authorized to take such acknowledgements;
(3) Filing and recording the articles with the proper state and
county officials after payment of the requisite organization tax and
filing and recording fees;
(4) Organization of the corporation ready for the transaction
of business;
(5) Securing the necessary permit from state officials
required),
is
to transact business in the domiciliary state.

(if

any

Steps in Creation of Trust.

On

the other hand a recent case has said the requisites

of a valid
trust are: “(1) A designated beneficiary; (2) a designated trustee,
who must not be the beneficiary; (3) a fund or other property suffi
ciently designated or identified to enable title thereto to pass to the
trustee; and (4) the actual delivery of the fund or other property,
or of a legal assignment thereof to the trustee, with the intention of
passing legal title thereto to him as trustee.”
Let us consider these things a little more fully in reference to the
creation of Corporations and of Trusts.
The Incorporation

Paper.

Under all general incorporation laws, some kind of a document
must be executed in a particular way, and filed, deposited, or record
ed, in a specific way. The name of this document is various,—“deed
of settlement,” “articles of association,” “articles of incorporation,”
“articles,” “certificate of incorporation,” “charter,”
“memorandum
of association,”—all of which Mr. MACHEN considers objectionable,
and suggests that “incorporation paper” be used, although as he
says, that “term does not seem to have been used in any state or

country.”

It

seems however that it is not fatal to call it

of Association when it ought to be called “Charter.”

*

Articles

Frost, Inc. and Org. Corp., p. 12 (4th Ed.).
Brown v. Spohr, 18o N. Y. 201, 209, 73 N. E. 14, 16; Central Trust Co. v.
Gaffney, 142 N. Y. S. 902, 905, 157 App. D. 501. Kemmerer v. Kemmerer (1908), 233
Ill. 327, 122 Am. St. R. 169, 84 N. E. 256; Ranney v. Byers (1908), 219 Pa. 332, 123
Am. St. R. 660, 68 Atl. 971.
Machen, Corporations, p. 30, § 32.
Kaiser v. Lawrence Sav. Bk. (1881), 56 Ia. 104, I Wilgus, Cases 607, on 608.

*

*

*
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In any event there must be a written or printed incorporation
paper?“ The drafting of this document, under printed forms, that
are usually furnished upon application seems to be a simple matter,
How
and is often done without much professional consideration.
ever since the document, will constitute, together with the law under
which it is executed, a contract of a dual nature,-—one between the
corporation and the state, and another among the shareholders them
selves,“'-’ to be construed “rigidly in favor of the public and against
the corporation ;”“""' and since the express powers of a corporation
are such as are found expressed in the statute under which the cor
poration is to be formed, or such, as though not so expressed, may
be lawfully claimed, if speciﬁed in the incorporation
paper. though
not otherwise, much skill is required to get the best results?“ Mr.
FROST enumerates 28 different classes of express powers, 21 of which
are expressed in most general laws, but 7 of which if desired. must
usually be claimed in the incorporation paper, if they can be had at
all ;“" and, although formerly it was held that one state could not
spawn its corporate progeny to do business in another state, yet that
view has been abandoned so completely that the states have become
unseemly competitors in vending their corporate wares, to such an
extent that every important business seeking incorporation
asks
where can the incorporation be had with a maximum of power, and
a minimum of inconvenience;
so where to incorporate has become
a question of extreme importance, and can be answered only par
tially by any lawyer after careful investigation and comparison of
statutes. Mr. FROST suggests 21 questions to be answered in this
connection, and these certainly do not cover more than half the

ground; all these considerations make it certain that the proper
drafting of important incorporation papers requires a high degree of
skill and experience?“
The incorporation paper must be executed as the statute provides,
and there are many pitfalls here also. If the statute says that “any
number” may form a corporation, by signing articles of association,
and stating, among other things, the “names and residence" of the
signers, and there are 27 signers, but only two state their residences,
the corporation in Indiana, at least, is not dc jure,"" so too if the
“1_Utley v. Union Tool C0. (1858), 11 Gray (Mass), 139, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 597.
1" Machen, Corporations, pp. 32-33; Wilgus, Corp. Cases, p.
707 et seq.
*1‘ Oregon Ry. Co. v. Oregonian Co. (1888),
130 U. S. 1, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 429.
1“ Machen, Corporations, §§ 48-63,
64-102.
"5 Frost, Inc. & Org. of Corporations,
4th Ed., §§ 17, 18, pp. 34-36.
1“ Ib. § 18, p.
35. V\filgus, Corporations, § 49.
1" Busenback v. Attica &c. Road Co. (1873),
43 Ind. 265, 1 Wilgus, Cases, p. 600.
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residence of directors is omitted when the statute requires it; so
where the "principal place of business” is to be stated, it won't do
to say “the operations of the company are to be carried
in a
certain county; and in Maryland it seems that even a church, though
it has been running as an incorporated body for years, taking a deed
property, giving
mortgage upon
issuing bonds, etc., can
for
just debts,
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the peace, when two were required." And
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McGregor (1865),
Wilgus, Cases,
11sHarris
Stickle
Cal. 124,
603.
Boyce
Wilgus, Cases,
Trustees &c. (1876), 46 Md. 359,
642.
Bergeron
85,
Wilgus, Cases, 611.
Hobbs (1897),
Wis. 641,
Am. St.
Aspen Hardware Co. (1895),
220,
Wilgus,
Jones
Colo. 263,
Am. St.
Cases, 637.
Frost, Inc.
Org. Corp., 4th Ed., Table iii.
Woodbury (1859),
Mokelumne Hill Mining Co.
Cal. 424,
Am. Dec. 658,
Wilgus, Cases 296; Harrod
Hamer, (1873),
Wilgus, Cases, 586.
Wis. 162,
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Trust Instrument.
see how it stands with an Express Trust.
MAITLAND
the old days no deed, no writing was necessary to create
a use, trust or confidence. I enfeoff you, and by word of mouth
declare that you are to hold to the use of X. You must hold to the
use of X. As to trusts this still is law, except in so far as it has been
altered by the Statute of Frauds.”
The Statute of Frauds of 1677, provided (§ 7) that “All declara
tions of or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements
or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing
signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or
by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void and of no
effect,” but by section 8, this was not to apply where the trust results
“by the implication or construction of law.”

Now let us

“In

says:

I

a

to

in

to
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It is to be noted here that this statute applies only to real property,
and not personal property;” that writing only, not a deed, no sealed
instrument, no witness, no acknowledgement is necessary; and fur
ther no writing is necessary to create the trust, but only to manifest
and prove it “The statute will be satisfied if the trust can be man
ifested and proved by any subsequent acknowledgement by the trust
ee, as by an express declaration by him or by a memorandum to that
effect, or by a letter under his hand, or by a recital in a deed exe
cuted by him; and the trust, however late the proof, operates retro
Equity
spectively from the time of
creation.” But Courts
went further and held “the Statute
Frauds does not prevent the
proof
fraud,” and “it
fraud for person who knows land has
trust,
deny the trust and claim the land
been conveyed
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and not merely manifested or proved by a writing.” So too the
13th Elizabeth forbidding all conveyances to delay, hinder or de
fraud, creditors; and the 27th Elizabeth forbidding voluntary con
veyances to defraud and deceive subsequent purchasers, of course,
apply to conveyances in trust as well as to other conveyances. These
are generally in force in this country.”
is
in it.

of

a

I

of

of

an

I

of

If
I

I

a

*
*
*

To quote MAITLAND again: “The creation of a trust may be a
perfectly unilateral act, there may not be more than one party to
declare myself
trustee
this watch for my son who
India.
afterwards sell that watch, although my son has never
heard
the benefit that
had intended for him,
commit
breach
my
equitable cause
trust and
son has
action against me.”
to

of

of

or to

be

of.

as

as

a

be

in

or

or

lawful,
he

deemed

in

for years, the latter shall

be

in

the use

of It

land

to

for life,

or

of

seized

to

the legal owner.

become

VIII, 1535, provided that the legal
that the beneficiary should thereafter
read that wherever one person “was
another,”
fee simple,
fee tail,

Henry

be

Uses,

estate should follow the use,

so

The Statute

a

is

declarant.”

27

the

of

of

is

in

as

In

to

in

be

a

to

to

be

its

if all

be

it

a

of

so

it
is

be

usually said that “no one can
compelled
While
undertake
Equity have been
trust,” yet because courts
jealous
its
pet, MAITLAND points out “In practice
very sage
would not
rely upon this doctrine, for one may very easily do something
regarded
say something that can
an acceptance
the trust”
duties,
easily got rid
with
attendant
that cannot
“There
you hear that anyone has been conveying property
you
fore
trustee, and you do not wish
burdened with
trustee's duties,
you will
repudiating
wise
some emphatic manner the rights
and the duties which were
have been thrust upon you.”
No specific words are necessary. “The words use and trust are
not sacramental terms.”
fact “the most untechnical words,” mere
precatory words, such
“desire,” “will,” “request,” “entreat,” “be
seech,” “recommend,” “hope,” “do not doubt,” have been held suffi
wills; all that
required
reasonably clear expression
cient
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seizin, estate, and possession,
such land
such like estate
had
the use.”
noted
The Statute does not apply
apply
chattels personal. (2) Nor does
leaseholds for years,
that
where the estate
the trustee
for years, since seizin applied

v.

E.

*
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53-54.
Equity, pp. 55-56.
Maitland, Equity, pp. 38, 66; Kemmerer
Kemmerer (1908), 233 Ill. 327, 122
169, 84 N.
256; Ames, Cases, pp. 77-107; Kenneson, Cases, pp. 16-21.
Am. St.
Maitland, Equity, 35; Kenneson, Cases, 34-37.
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Dyer, 155a, pl. 20, Kenneson, Cases, 37.
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People
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only to freeholds; but on the other hand if land is conveyed to A and
his heirs to hold to the use of B for 1,000 years, this use is executed
and B becomes the legal owner, not of the fee, but of the term of
years; but if B assigns it to X to the use of Y, the latter will have
only an Equitable estate. (3) Again the Statute does not apply where
there is an active trust. “I convey land unto A and his heirs, to the
use that they shall sell the land and divide the proceeds among my
children, or upon trust that they shall so sell and divide. The Stat
ute has nothing to say to this case. You do not find one person seized
in trust for another person, you find A seized upon trust to make a
sale.” The test seems to be, does the instrument merely tell A that
B is to have the enjoyment or does it impose upon A some special
duty in regard to the property as to manage and control
and col
lect and pay the profits
the beneficiary?;
the latter the trust
active, not passive, and the Statute
Uses does not thrust the legal
1557,
title
the beneficiary. (4) Finally after Tyrrell's Case
executing the first use,
was held that the Statute exhausted itself
use,
and so,
the case
use upon
did not execute the second
conveyancing.
use.” This however
matter that applies
Again no filing
recording
necessary
the trust instrument
make the trust valid,
least
the parties
those who know
ought
know
existence
terms.”
The trust deed
the Sugar Trust case provided that “The cus
tody
the deed was
the president
the board, with sole
independent
control,
any corporation,
and
and not
shown
person whatsoever except
express direction
firm
the
required
put
deed,
board.”
the form
course,
some states, then,
must conform
the statutes relating
thereto, and those relating
registration and recording such deeds,
order
furnish constructive notice. But these rules are simple,
definite and certain, and easily complied with." Unless the trust
partnership, and there are
do business
artificial name,
statutes requiring registration, there are no other statutes except
trusts, except those relating
few states, affecting the creation
perpetuities. These will
referred
other connections.
Again no fees are
paid
the state,
other officers, except
recording fees when the instrument
conveyance. Of
deed
conveyed
trust, the rules relat
course
the legal estate
land
ing
the conveyance
the legal title
the trustee, apply just the
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same as they apply to a conveyance

—

of land to any other party. And
in general whatever rules apply to the transfer of any particular
kind of property, to another person, will apply when such is to be
conveyed to a trustee in trust.” And a promise to create a volun
tary trust will not be enforced. The rules we have been discussing
apply only to the creation of the trust estate itself.
It seems here again that the balance of simplicity so far as formal
ities of creation are concerned is in favor of the trust.
141Ib.

II.
Parties

to

Be Incorporated:

Coke’s second requisite of corporate existence was parties to in
corporate, and he indicated that these might be either natural or arti
ﬁcial. It seems now that the latter, i. e. corporations cannot, unless
authorized expressly or by necessary implication be either an in
corporator or member of another corporation?“‘ General incorpor
ation laws contemplate incorporators
and members.
The former
are persons, in the case of business corporations, whose function it
is to bring the corporation
into existence under the statute; they
may or may not themselves. become members by taking stock. When
the corporation
is organized, their functions,
as incorporators,
cease?“ On the other hand the members are those who become
such by ownership of stock, and in the beginning, this ownership is
If this is made after the corpora
acquired through a subscription.
tion is created, and capable of contracting, the ordinary rules of con
tract may apply.“'*
In most cases, however, there can be no corporation until mem
bers are secured, and this must be either before or contemporan
This sit
eously with the coming into existence of the corporation.
uation has puzzled the courts exceedingly.
There are numerous
views; (I) Such a preliminary agreement has no force and effect,
unless it strictly conforms to the statute, as signing and acknowledg
ing the incorporation paper ;‘“ (2) That it is a valid contract from
the time the requisite amount is subscribed, from which a party can
not thereafter withdraw and which is enforceable against the estate
of one. who dies before the corporation comes into existence and
accepts it ;“" (3) That such a preliminary subscription is a mere
withdrawable offer, revocable by death or insanity, at any time be
fore the corporation comes into existence and accepts it expressly or

' Continued

from December issue.
"11 Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram (1393) 6 Wash. !34, 36 Am. St. R. 130, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, 553. Note, Ib., p. 889.
1" Nickum v. Burkhardtt, (1897) 30 Ore. 464, 60 Am. St. R. 822, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 391.
1“ Southwestern State C0. v. Stephens (1909)
139 Wis. 616, 131 Am. St. R. 1074,
29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92, 120 N. W. 403.
"Sedalia, Warsaw etc. Co. v. Wilkerson, (1884) 83 Mo. 235, 1 Wilgus, Cases. 459;
Coppage v. Hutton (1890) 124 Ind 401, 7 L. R. A. 591, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 469.
1“ Tonica & Petersburg R. R. Co. v. McNeeley
(1859) =1 Ill. 71, 1 Wilgus, Cases,
491.

–

—

32

impliedly;” (4) That
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This again shows the simpler theory that underlies the trust.
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such a subscription is a mere withdrawable
offer to the future corporation, but a contract among the subscrib
impos
ers." Where the courts have not already passed on
goes well,
sible
tell which view they will take.
Of course
duly formed and accepts the subscriptions
and the corporation
made, they will
binding, but until that time there
always great
uncertainty from the possibility
death
withdrawal
sub
scriber. The difficulty
the courts
that “it takes two
make
contract,” and, since the corporation cannot
bound until
comes
into existence and has proper officers
bind
the other party
cannot
bound. To get around this view subscriptions are some
times made with
trustee for the unborn corporation, which
court
equity will enforce
favor whenever the corporation comes
into existence.***
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perpetuities, can
least
within the rule relating
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other words only one party
trust;
necessary
accept
declare
the trustee has
expressly
impliedly, and the beneficiary does not have
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express an intent
that. All that
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and
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write
letter
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High
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£1000.
my name, the wine
my cellar,” this does not
Consols standing
create trust, nor does
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valid gift for
letter will not do
make such conveyances; even
execute
deed covenanting
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323,
Pond Steam Mill Co.
Felt (1895)
Me. 234,
Am. St.
Cases 474.
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co.
Davis,
701,
Minn. 110,
Am. St.
796,
Wilgus, Cases, 492. Nebraska Chickory Co.
W. 1026,
Led
nicky, (1907) 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 245.
Wilgus, Cases
San Joaquin Land Co.
West (1892)
Cal. 399,
Pac. 785,
497; West
Wilgus, Cases 5oo.
Crawford (1889)
Cal. 19,
Ames, Cases, note
213; Kenneson's Cases,
89,
Eng. Encyc.
Am.
Law,
11oo.
v.

Bryant's
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Wilgus,

self a trustee, I mean to give” instead, and an intention to give, with
out delivering the gift is not a gift. “The two intentions are very
different, the giver means to get rid of his rights, the man who is
intending to make himself a trustee intends to retain his rights but
to come under an onerous obligation.”
“An imperfect gift is no
declaration of trust.”
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or
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“Every person who can hold and dispose of any legal or equit
able estate or interest in property, may create a trust in respect of
such estate or interest,”—the state, a private corporation, married
women, an infant at least till he avoids
and aliens and non-resi
dents." Still further
the constitutional right under the Fed
eral constitution of
citizen of one state
constitute
citizen of
personal,
another state
trustee
his property
real
wherever the property
located. The Indiana statute forbidding
this was declared unconstitutional.”
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Any one capable
holding property, may
trustee,
infant,
alien,
person
married women, corporation,
even
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lunatic, trustee,
mind. And
the case
an infant
court of
equity can vest the title
carry out the
some suitable person
trust. One
several beneficiaries may
trustee
the settlor
appoints.”
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beneficiary,—infants,
So too any one can
married women,
corporations, unincorporated
bodies, residents
non-residents,
any one capable
taking and holding any kind
property and
necessary.”
acceptance
the beneficiary
requisites
corporate existence named
The other three
Lord
Coke,—name, place, and proper words, along with some others are
provided for under general laws
the Incorporation Paper. This
usually requires (1) the name, (2) the place, (3) the purpose, (4)
directors, and (6) the duration
the capital stock, (5) the number

* Maitland,
* 27 Am.
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Equity, pp. 73, 74.
Eng. Encyc., 1st Ed. 13.
Sears, Trust Estates etc.,
194; Farmers' Loan
Chicago etc.
Trust Co.
Ry. Co. (1886)
Fed. Rep. 146; Roby
Smith (1891) 131 Ind. 342, 20 N.
1093.
Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 24, 25. Note, Ames, Cases,
27 Am.
193.
Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 16, 17; Cook, Trusts
Trustees,
27 Am.
Io-1 18.
Eng. Encyc. 1st Ed. 23; Ames, Cases, pp. 215-231; Kenneson, Cases,
27 Am.
90-97; Loring, Trustees Handbook,
(3d Ed.); Connecticut Riv. Sav. Bank
Albee
(1892) 64 Vt. 571,
Am. St.
944.

The purpose of course of this Incorporation Paper
to be stated?-"“
is to give deﬁnite form to a particular corporation,—to
make spe
ciﬁc for a single corporation what is general and applicable to all
corporations of that class.
Although
the creation

as we have seen no formal

of

instrument

a valid trust, yet in the cast

of

is necessary to

for

an express trust

business a deed or declaration of trust is drawn up: (1) Providing
for a name; (2) Designating trustees, and providing for their suc
cession; (3) Providing for the raising and conveying the trust res
or fund to the trustees, and deﬁning their rights, powers and duties

in reference thereto; (4) Providing for the issue of transferable
certiﬁcates to those who are the cestuis que trust, in proportion to
their respective beneﬁcial interests in the property and proﬁts; (5)

Providing for division of proﬁts; (6) Limiting liability of trustees
and beneﬁciaries; (7) Fixing the duration, and providing for.disso
lution at the termination of the trust?“
These

are so similar

to the requirements

of

the

incorporation

paper that they may be taken up in order and compared with some
detail.

.

Corporate Name:

It was long ago said that the corporate name is a baptismal one,
It is now
and of the very. being of the corporate constitution.
universally required to be stated in 'the incorporation paper, although
it perhaps could be acquired under the common law by user. When
rightfully acquired the corporation is considered as having a fran
chise therein, with the same exclusive right to its use in the incor
porating state that it would have in a trade mark, including the
In several
right to enjoin its use by another domestic corporation.
provisions exist in relation to the selection and
states particular
publication of the corporate name that must be strictly complied
with. It has been held that a change of corporate name without au
thority, makes the members liable as partners?“

Trust Name

:

In the absence of a statute forbidding, a natural person may do
business in his own name or in any name he pleases to assume as a
business name, so long as it does not infringe another’s right in a
1“ 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 435-440.
"’ Conyngton, Corporate Organization,
_ "' 1 Wilgus, Cases, pp. 816-829.

p. 366.
V

name already in use by the latter.”
Since the trustees are natural
persons, they may choose such name in which to carry on business
if they so desire, or the name may be, probably should be and usually
is designated in the deed of trust, as for example, a trust deed in
which Richard Olney, Moorefield Storey and William F. Beal are
trustees (and therefore likely to have been drawn with the utmost
legal skill) provides: “49. The trusts of these presents may be col
lectively designated for all purposes thereof as the Old South Build
ing Trust, and the Trustees may for the like purposes be referred to
as the Trustees of the Old South Building Trust.”

signed by similarly distinguished lawyers, provides;
“First. The trustees, in their collective capacity, shall be designated,
so far as practicable, as the “Massachusetts Electric Companies,”
and under that name shall, so far as practicable, conduct all business
performance
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has Michigan, providing that “No
person
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under any desig
nation, name,
style, corporate
otherwise, other than the real
name
names
the individual
individuals owning, conducting,
transacting, such business, unless such persons shall file
the
office
the clerk
the county
counties
which such person
persons own, conduct,
own, conduct
transact
intend
place
business,
transact such business,
maintain an office
certificate setting forth the name
names under which such bus
iness owned
or
be conducted,
transacted and the true or
or

or
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ing
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made until
new cer
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v.

Sparks
Dispatch Transfer Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 531, 24 Am. St.
351. Note,
Cummings,
132 Am. St.
571. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
Ore. —, 133 Pac.
1169,
N.
252.
Conyngton, Corporate Organization, Form 62.
Sears, Trust Estates, etc.,
287.
Public Acts, Mich. 1907, No. 101,
119.
Public Acts, Mich. 1913, No. 164,
286.

as to make the beneficiaries partners, all their names would have to
be given.
This however should and can be avoided. Such state
ments as the above are generally required in annual reports of cor
porations, and are not more onerous than they are.
Corporate
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have already referred to the uncertainty of the statutory provis
ions relating to place or location. Where the New Hampshire stat
ute provided that the incorporation paper should state the “place
in which
business
carried on,” and the paper drawn
supposedly competent attorney, stated “the places
business
were Nashua
New Hampshire, and East Brookfield,
Massa
chusetts,” and the manufacturing business was done
East Brook
field, and the corporate meetings held
Nashua, the Massachu
jure,
corporation
setts Supreme Judicial Court, held there was
facto,
estoppel, and the treasurer was individually liable
on
note given
the corporation's note." So too corporations are
frequently dissolved for failure
domiciliary office
maintain
incorporating
requires
state,
the
whether the statute
not.
formerly
corporate
was
held that
stockholders' meetings could not
lawfully
held outside
the creating state because
the very
things
incorporating
conferring
privilege
nature
the
statute
such
franchise,
necessarily inoperative beyond such state, and out
only
side
such state the assembled stockholders are possessed
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gradually passing away,
their natural powers."
This doctrine
statutory provisions controlling, and with pro
and
the absence
authorizing,
visions
the incorporation paper
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onably safe
hold shareholders meetings outside the creating
many conflicting decisions and statu
state." However there are
tory provisions that
never wise
advise such
done."
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65
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Montgomery
Forbes, (1889) 148 Mass. 249,
342,
Wilgus, Cases, 594.
Frost, Incorporation and Org.
Corp., pp. 64,
(4th Ed.).
Wilgus, Cases, 841.
Miller
Ewer (1847)
Me. 509,
Am. Dec. 619,
746,
Missouri Lead etc. Co.
Reinhard (1893) 114 Mo. 218,
Am. St.
Wilgus, Cases, 844; Graham
161,
Wilgus, Cases,
Boston etc.
(1886) 118
846, note
847.
Machen, Corp.
1212.

or in another, there is no difﬁculty as to “place of business,” and no
place of business~ is usually stated, further than to designate the city
in which annual or other meetings are to be held.
Here again the
'
.
Trust is simpler?“°
Corporate

Purposes:

Incorporation statutes frequently provide for incorporation “for
any lawful purpose” with certain exceptions, usually of a public
service character. There is frequent difﬁculty in determining wheth
er two or more purposes can be joined in one incorporation paper;
the statutes in some states expressly authorize this; in some states
the state ofﬁcials so construe their ambiguous statutes; in others the
statutes divide business into classes, which cannot be joined; in still
other states only one purpose or general object can be claimed;
while in still others, the name of the corporation must indicate the
various purposes.
This serves to indicate the confusion, and the
This is mitigated however somewhat
difficulty encountered here."°
the
rule
that
that
cannot
be properly claimed are mere
by
things
This however would not help
surplusage, and can be rejected.
out an incorporation paper where two objects are joined when only
one is permitted, but either of which would be valid if standing
alone.
Perhaps the corporation would be permitted to elect, and
amend the paper, and thereafter carry on the one line of business
In any event the “object” clauses of an important corpor
elected.
ation paper requires special skill and care in drawing.

Trust Purposes:
There seems to be no such difﬁculty, or in fact no such limitations,
applying to Trusts. They can be created to carry on any lawful
business or businesses desired, one or many as the parties, the declar
ants and the trustees provide for, unless there are express statutory
limitations.
They have been created for manufacturing, mining,
lumbering, agriculture, transportation, mercantile, real estate, hold
ing shares, disposing of patents, and numerous other purposes?"
And as we saw above “Every kind of valuable property, both real
and personal, that can be assigned at law may be the subject-matter
of a Trust.“” Here again with equal attention the purposes for
which a Trust may be formed may be more certainly provided for
than in similar incorporation papers.
'°° See Forms, given in Sears, Cook (Corp.) and Conyngton (Corp. Organization).
"" Frost, Incorp. and Organ. Corps., p.
19 ct seq.; Machen, Corps., §§ 46-108.
Y“ Sears, Trust Estates etc., p.
253.
‘"* Perry, Trusts, 6th Ed., §
67.

For instance in the Massachusetts Gas Companies, the declara
tion of trust authorized its trustees to engage: (I) in manufacturing,
buying, selling and dealing in coal, oil, coke, gas and all products
thereof: (2) in manufacturing and supplying gas or electricity or
any other agent for light, heat, power or other purposes; (3) in ac

quiring, owning, managing, exchanging, selling and dealing in the
stocks, shares and securities of corporations, trusts or associations,
engaged in whole or in part in any business above mentioned, or
in owning and operating railways or railroads or transporting pas
sengers, merchandise, mails or express matter, or in manufacturing,
selling or repairing machines, equipments supplies or other articles
used by corporations, trusts or associations of any of the classes
above mentioned. * * * * (4) in any business similar in character to
that above mentioned which the trustees may deem expedient.” and
to acquire, hold and dispose of the stocks of such institutions.“
Corporate

Stock:

a

a

it

a

is

it,

The theory of the capital stock of a corporation is that the power
to have such, or increase or decrease
corporate franchise,
and must be expressly conferred by the state, or otherwise
does not
exist?“ Incorporation statutes frequently ﬁx maximum and mini
mum limits, and sometimes limit indebtedness to the amount of capi
tal stock, also special provisions are almost always made in reference
to increase or decrease of the same, otherwise unanimous consent
of shareholders, as well as the consent of the state would be neces
sary."" Under all the incorporation laws, the incorporation paper
must state the number of shares, and the par value thereof (except
now in New York) and these cannot be changed except by an
amendment made to the articles of incorporation.
In the absence
of statutory provisions preventing, in the original organization of
the company, preferred and common stock may be provided for in
the incorporation paper, but not so afterward except by uanimous
consent. unless there are statutory provisions making other regula
In several states as in Michigan the statutes provide for
tions.""'
limited dividend;
certain kind of redeemable preferred stock with
in such states other kinds of preferred stock, or with greater divi
dends cannot be provided for. In some states the statute, because

1

1

1

1" Sears, Trust Estates, p. 303.
1'“ Cooke v. Marshall
Wilgus, Cases, 761.
(1899) 191 Pa. St. 315,
1" Railway Co. v. Allerton (1873) 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 233,
Wilgus, Cases, 442,
note 763.
1" Kel-it v.
Wilgus, Cases, 790,- note
Quicksilver Mining Co. (1879) 78 N. Y. 159,
793; Campbell v. Zylonite Co. 121 N. Y. 455.

the common law was otherwise, expressly provides “that each share
In such
holder shall be entitled to one vote for each share held.”
a state can non-voting preferred shares be created? This is answer
In some states there is
ed differently in different jurisdictions?"
a statutory liability attaching to the ownership of stock, and our
Supreme Court has just held that when a corporation organized in
one state having no such statutory liability, is expressly authorized
to do business in a state having such liability the shareholders be
come liable thereon for business done in such state?" This makes
stock holding in corporations organized to do business throughout
the United States a precarious matter.

Trust Stock

:

How is it with Express Trusts? Can they be created with a cap
ital stock represented by transferable shares? Or can the property
held in trust by the trustees be represented by shares issued by the
trustees, transferable, so as to give purchasers the same rights as
original beneﬁciaries?
There is no doubt now, but that at Common Law, under merely
their power to contract, individuals may between themselves engage
in business together, each contributing property thereto, and take
certiﬁcates representing their interests, which they may if the agree
ment so provides transfer to others. For I00 years or so, 1720 to
1825, the English Bubble Act forbade this, but this was repealed in
England, and was never, or if at all, only to a very limited extent
in force in this country.
The courts in this country have held
from the beginning that this could be done,"° and now hold, that
although by constitutional provisions “corporations can be created
only under general laws” and corporation is deﬁned in the constitu
tion to “include all associations and joint stock companies having
any of the powers and privileges of corporations not possessed by
individuals or partnerships,” and there is no statute authorizing the
creation of joint stock companies with transferable shares, still,
such institutions can be created by contract among individuals under
the exercise of their common law rights and not be corporations.
Such was the holding in a well considered Idaho case, following
There is therefore no law
many similar decisions in other states.“‘°
have
this.
further
we
Still
already seen that the in
against doing
1" State v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 892; Colonist Printing etc. Co. v. Duns
muir, 32 Can. Sup. Ct. 679.
1" Thomas v. Matthiessen (1913) 232 U. S. 221.
1" 1 Wilgus, Cases, note p. 175. Sears, Trust Estates, N 52-54.
“° Spottswood v. Morris (1906) 12 Id. 360, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665, 85 Pac. 1094.
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the stock provisions

a

are illustrations

in

The following
Trusts:—

of

of

in
it

of

it.

terest of a beneficiary is substantially a property right inheritable,
descendible, and transferable as other rights are. The 9th section
of the English Statute of Frauds required an assignment to be in
writing; and since the beneficiaries' rights are not those of joint or
co-tenants in the trust fund, but wholly incorporeal and intangible,
just what the trust declared provides, the most natural way to rep
resent them is by a certificate, and the most natural and convenient
way of transfer is by an assignment of the certificate. In Estate of
Oliver, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, held that the interest of
the stockholder “was an interest in the profits made.
He had no
title to the land bought by the trustees for the company, as a tenant
in common or otherwise and could neither convey nor encumber
His interest
was personal estate and the extent
that interest
was shown by his cerificate
stock.”
few

-

of

its

5

to

if

in

is a

to

its

a

of

of

to

if

to

to
6

to

of

a

of

is

in

by

“Central Massachusetts Light and Power Co. The beneficial in
agreement and declaration
terest
the trust created
trust
preferred
6,500
divided into
shares and 6,500 common shares.
par value
The latter have no par value. The former have
$100, are entitled
per cent
cumulative preferred dividends
per cent after
the first year and increasing thereafter yearly
May 15, 1918. The preferred shares have
liquida
preference
tion and are entitled
$11o
the trust
terminated within two
years, and
amounts increasing thereafter yearly up
$125
the
termination occurs after May 15, 1918.”
The Worcester Railways and Investment Company issued “nego
tiable certificates or evidences
interest for 60,000 shares, each
representing
share
fractional beneficial interest
1/60000 in"
property, the trustees having discretion
fix the dividends there
*

On.188

p.

of

as

of

of

R.

20

* Oliver’s Estate (1890) 136 Pa. 43, Am. St. 894.
* Report (No. 1788 House) Special Commission, Mass.,
tions (1913)
40.
* Ib. 20.
* Ib. 44.
p. p.

be

of

of

be

of

B 6

to

A

of

5

to

is

of

of

the Massachusetts Light and Traction Companies,
“divided into 100,000 shares
the par value
$1.00 each,
bearing
per cent. non-cumulative dividends,
designated
“preferred
stock,” 50,000 shares
the par value
$5.00 each,
bearing
per cent. non-cumulative dividends,
designated “pre
stock,” and 10,000 shares
$25,000,
ferred
the par value
common stock.”

The capital

on Voluntary

Associa

___4I._.
It would seem again here that the Express Trust is much more
ﬂexible than the usual corporation provisions are in reference to
shares, there being no state to interfere, or statute to follow, and the
whole matter can be moulded to suit the parties, and may be changed
in any way or at any time, in accordance with such provisions as may
be inserted in the trust agreement.
The only point of difficulty here
is in reference to partnership liability, a matter which is considered
later on.
Corporate Directors:
Statutes usually require the number to be stated, and when once
ﬁxed can be changed only by an amendment regularly adopted.
Statutes also usually require them to be shareholders to the extent
of a few shares. Being elected there is no power of removal, unless
expressly provided for in the statute, incorporation paper, or by
laws.
By perhaps all business corporation statutes there must be
directors, and in them the ordinary powers of the corporation are
vested?“ They however have no legal or equitable title to the cor
Their
They act only in duly called meetings?“
porate property.
functions are sui generis, and have been likened to those of agents,
trustees or mandatories of the corporation, but perhaps they are
Directors, however, are not agents of the share
strictly neither.“°
holders, and except in certain peculiar situations are not generally
said to be in a position of trust toward them?” Courts are not in
accord upon the degree of care and diligence required of directors,
one line of authorities saying that the care and diligence that an
ordinarily prudent man takes of his own business, is required,
while another line of authorities says, since they get no pay, no
greater care is required than that required of a gratuitous bailee."°
They have no authority to sell or dispose of the corporate capital or
property, except such as is properly done in the ordinary course of
business.
For defaults of the directors affecting all the share
holders alike, they are primarily liable only to the corporation, and
1“ In the Matter of Election of Directors, 63 N. J. L. 168, 2 Wilgus, Cases, p. 1744.
1*“Blood v. La Serena,
H3 Cal. 221; Metropolitan Elev. R. R. C0. v. Manhattan El.
Ry. Co. (1884) 11 Daly (N. Y.) 373, 1 \\"ilgus, Cases, 694, note 702.
"" Bank of Little Rock v. McCarthy
(1892) 55 Ark. 473, 29 Am. St. R. 60, 1 Wilgus,
Cases, note 850.
*” Allen v. Curtis
(1857) 26 Conn. 456, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1727; Ellis v. Ward (1890)
137 Ill. 509, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1729; VVallacc v. Lincoln Sav. Bank (1891) 89 Tenn. 630,
24 Am. St. R. 625, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1731.
1“ See “Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder," by
H. L. Wilgus, 8 Mich. Law Rev. (Feby. 1910) p. 267.
1" North Hudson Building & Loan Assn. v. Childs
(1892) 82 Wis. 460, 33 Am. St.
R. 57, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1737. See also 2 \\'ilgus, Cases, pp. 1874-1888.

*** -

—

42

—

only when they so control the corporation as to prevent it from
bringing a proper action to protect itself amounting to a substantial
breach of trust, can the shareholder bring a representative suit in
equity to prevent a failure of justice.
Courts of equity have no
special jurisdiction over directors merely as such. It is only when
there is a breach of trust upon their part, that they can be called to
account in equity.”

of Trusts:

Trustees

In case of the Trust, the Trustees stand, so far as control and
management are concerned, if the Trust agreement so provides, in
a position somewhat analogous to that of directors in a corporation.
They, however, exercise control, because they are the owners of
the property, and not the agents of the beneficiaries, or of any one
They act as owners, but as owners that are obliged to render
else.
an account in equity not merely to all the beneficiaries as a whole,
but to each and every beneficiary; for the beneficiary's right is in
dividual, and in personam, and enforceable in equity primarily,
not secondarily, against the trustee.”
A trustee has whatever estate either legal or equitable is neces
sary for him fully to carry out the trust created but no further;”
and (1) “A trustee is bound to do anything that he is expressly bid
den to do by the instrument creating the trust.
(2) A trustee may
safely do anything that he is expressly authorized to do by that in
strument, even loan or invest money without adequate security.
(3) A trustee is bound to refrain from doing anything that is ex
pressly forbidden by that instrument.
(4) Within these limits a
trustee must play the part of a prudent owner and a prudent man
of business,” not as if he had himself alone to consider, but also
“for the benefit of other people for whom

provide.”

he felt morally bound to

Upon
of

the other hand, however, just because the trustee is owner
the property, if the trustee dies intestate his estate devolves upon

§

127; Whiteley

R.

Cases, 88; Hawes

Ill. Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St.
&

25

Wilgus,

v.

(18 How.) 331,
Cases, 1716.

1

S.

2 59

U.

Wilgus,

98; Cook, Trusts
Trustees,
722,
Eng. Rul. Cas. 326.
A.
Equity, pp. 86-90.
C.

Equity,

p.

Missouri

&

S.

v.

355,
Maitland,

*

33 Ch.

v.

*
* Reichert
E. 166.
* Maitland,

12

N.

Dodge
Woolsey (1855)
450,
Oakland (1881) 104 U.
Ames, Cases, pp. 235-278.

D.

v.

1st

his heir or personal representative if he had a fee; so also he can
devise the estate, or convey it inter vivos,” in fact “At law the
trustee has all those powers of alienating inter vivos, mortgaging and

307, 83
Learoyd,

so forth that he would have were there no trust in existence,” but
of course any heir, devisee, executor, administrator or party taking
with notice is bound by the trust. To prevent these results several
trustees are appointed to hold as joint—tenants, with its attendant
survivorship?°°

Unlike directors the act of a majority of trustees does not bind
minority,‘ all must join in a conveyance, or‘ in a receipt. They
not at all agents for one another, nor can one shelter himself
saying he was out voted, if he, nevertheless, acquiesced in
action taken.“"
Of course, however all of these matters can
modiﬁed to suit the wishes of the settlor.

the
are
by
the
be

The following from the declaration of trust of the Massachusetts
what may be
manufacturing trust,—indicates
done?”
“The trustees shall hold the legal title to all property at any time
Gas Companies,-a

belonging to this trust, and subject only to the speciﬁc limitations
herein contained, they shall have the absolute control of the conduct
of all business of the trust; and the following enumeration of spe
ciﬁc duties and powers shall not be construed in anyway as a limi
tation upon the general powers intended to be conferred upon them.
“The Trustees shall have authority to adopt and use a common
seal; to make all such contracts as they may deem expedient in the
conduct of business of the trust; from time to time to release, sell,
exchange, or otherwise dispose of, at public or private sale, any or
all of the trust property, whether real or personal, for such prices
either in cash or the stocks, shares, or securities of other corpora
tions, trusts or associations and upon such terms as to credit or oth
erwise as they may deem expedient; to guarantee or assume the ob
ligations of other corporations, trusts or associations and to enter
into such agreements by way of indemnity or otherwise as they may
deem expedient in connection with the acquisition of property from
the subscribers as hereinbefore provided or otherwise; to confer,
by way of substitution,

such power and authority

on the President,

Treasurer, Secretary, and Executive Committee, and other ofﬁcers
and agents appointed by them, as they may deem expedient; to bor
row money for the purposes of the trust and give the obligations of
the Trustees therefor; to loan any money from time to time in the
1"‘ Maitland,

Equity, p. 93.
v. Missouri etc. Coal Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307, 83
N. E. 166; Mattison v. Mattison (1909) 53 Ore. 254, 100 Pac. 4, 133 Am. St. R. 829;
Adams’ Estate (1903) 221 Pa. 77, 70 Atl. 438, 128 Am. St. R. 727, Estate of Fesmire, 134
Pa. St. 67, 19 Am. St. 676.
“"' Sears, Trust Estates etc., p.
303.

"" Reichcrt

.

-
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hands of the Trustees, with or without security, on such terms as
they may deem expedient; to subscribe for, acquire, own, sell or oth
erwise dispose of such real or personal property including the stocks,
shares, and securities of any other corporations, trusts, or associa
tions, as they may deem expedient in connection with the purposes of
the trust; to vote in person or by proxy on all shares of stock at
any time held by them, and to collect and receive the income, interest,
and proﬁts of any such stock or securities; to collect, sue for, re
ceive, and receipt for all sums of money at any time becoming due
to said trust; to employ counsel and to begin, prosecute, defend, and
settle suits at law, in equity or otherwise, and to compromise or re
fer to arbitration any claims in favor of or against the trust; and in
general to do all such matters and things as in their judgment will
promote or advance the business which they are authorized to carry
on, although such matters and things may be neither speciﬁcally
authorized nor incidental to any matters or things speciﬁcally author
ized. In addition to the powers herein granted the Trustees shall
have all power with reference to the conduct of the business and
management of the property of the trust which are possessed by
directors of a manufacturing corporation under the laws of Massa
chusetts.
“So far as strangers to the trust are concerned a resolution of the
Trustees authorizing a particular act to be done shall be conclusive
evidence in favor of strangers that such act is within the power
of the Trustees; and no purchaser from the Trustees sh_all be
bound to see to the application of the purchase money or other con
sideration paid or delivered by or for said purchaser to or from the
Trustees.
“Stated meetings of the Trustees shall be held at least once a
month, and other meetings shall be held from time to time upon the
call of the President or any three of the Trustees.
A majority of
the Trustees shall constitute a quorum; and the concurrence of all
the Trustees shall not be necessary to the validity of any action
taken by them, but the decision expressed by a vote of a majority of
the Trustees present and voting at any meeting shall be conclusive.”
Other provisions authorize the adoption of by—laws, election of
oﬁicers, and executive committee, and agents, accepting resignations,
removing officers, ﬁlling vacancies, keeping records, etc.

Also “The Trustees shall not be liable for any error of judgment
or for any loss arising out of any act or omission in the execution
of this trust, so long as they act in good faith, nor shall they be per
sonally liable for the acts or omissions of each other, or for the acts
or omissions of any ofﬁcer, agent, or servant elected or appointed by

‘__._

-

or acting for them; and they shall not be obliged to give any bond to
secure the due performance of this trust by them.
“Any Trustee may acquire, own, and dispose of shares in this trust
to the same extent as if he were not a Trustee."
Corporate

Life

or Duration:

VV e have seen that corporations were often said to be immortal.
This of course meant that there was continuous or perpetual suc
cession for an indeﬁnite and unlimited time unless the corporation
was dissolved in some of the ways known to the law,——loss of all
members, act of Parliament, surrender of franchises, or quo war
ranto for misuser or non—user?“"
This is still the law, unless there

are constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary, but there
are such in nearly ever state, the limit ﬁxed being usually from 20
to 50 years, and in many cases the proposed duration must be stated
in the Incorporation Paper.
In many states a renewal may be had
for a like period. With us the Legislature has no right to dissolve
However,
unless the power to do so is reserved to the State?°°
through quo warranto proceedings for violation of duty injurious
ly affecting the public, the courts may pronounce judgment of dis
solution?“ During the whole of its prescribed life, the corporation
is said to have perpetual or continuous succession, and remains the
same corporation regardless of any change in membership.

Trust Duration:
In this respect, because of the “rule against perpetuities,” the
This
corporate organization seems simpler than the Trust form.
rule in all its applications is exceedingly intricate and technical, and
frequently papers, especially wills, drawn by the best lawyers have
contained provisions that have been rendered ineffective because
In the matter of an ordinary business
offending against the rule.
trust, however, while perhaps a perpetual or immortal existence can
not be acquired, an existence that is as long as or in many cases
much longer than the ordinary corporate life can be obtained.
The English rule seems to have two branches, one relating to the
vesting of future estates, and the other to trusts for accumulations.
These may be stated: (1) “Every future contingent estate limited
1" State v. Payne
(1895) 129 Mo. 468, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 830; Boston Glass Manufac
tory v. Langdon (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass) 49, 35 Am. Dec. 292, 1 Wilgus, Cases, 866.
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 1
Wilgus, Cases, 708.
3°‘ People v. Dashaway Association (1890) S4 Cal. 114, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1298.

to arise on an event that might possibly happen later than 21 years
and the period of gestation after the death of persons living
at the creation of the estate is void the day it is created.” (2)
“Where property, real and personal, is given to trustees to hold and
to receive and invest the rents and profits of the real property and
the income of the personal property, and to deliver the property and
income at a certain or contingent future time to the beneficiaries, if
that time may possibly happen more than 21 years and the period of
gestation after the death of persons living at the creation of the trust,

the direction to accumulate and the gift of the accumulated fund are
void absolutely.”
Neither of these rules would seem to prevent the creation of trusts
for indefinite periods, as A grants property to B in fee to control
and manage for C in fee, for each estate, the legal and equitable,
is vested in the respective parties, and they together may at any time
if they choose terminate the trust, and together convey an absolute

title to the property."

A

recent writer however has said “The courts in this country

seem to be moving very rapidly toward the general announcement

of

the rule that trusts of absolute indestructible equitable interests can
not be made to last for longer than lives in being and twenty one
years, and that any provision which may by any possibility postpone
the term of the trusteeship for longer than that period is wholly void

from the beginning.”
It has been held in Illinois that where the trustees have the abso

lute power to sell at any time free of the rights of the beneficiaries,
the rule does not apply;" and likewise in Massachusetts, if the in
come is not to be accumulated, but distributed as it accrues, and
where the whole equitable interest is at every moment vested abso
lutely in the shareholders, and can be sold by them at any time, the
rule does not apply;” but if the trustees and beneficiaries cannot
together convey the complete title without violating the trust, the
rule is violated.”

In New York the statute provides that “Every future
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power of alienation is suspended
when there are no persons in
being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.”
Under this statute it has been held that if the trust term is longer
than the period of two lives in being, but the trustees have at
convey the complete title neither the rule nor
times the power
statute
violated.” And where the trust
for the sole benefit of
appointees,
the settlors
their
the rule does not apply, even though
the beneficiaries are infants,
are numerous, and the entire inter
disposed
est cannot
without their consent."
New York, Michigan and Minnesota, the period seems
California,
Wisconsin, two lives and 20 years;
two lives only;
Idaho, North and South Dakota, the period
lives,
fixed
being
number;
the creation, but there
no limitation
all
being and
years there
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“life
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are illustrations: The term
the Boston and Wor
“twenty years after the death
cester Electric Companies
the
persons named
last survivor
the agreement and declara
tion.”
the Massachusetts Electric Companies “The trust
years from the date
continue for the term
the agree
ment, unless the holders of
least two thirds
the shares then
outstanding shall
meeting called for that purpose vote for its
termination or continuance.”
The Massachusetts Northern Rail
ways put
twenty years
“The trust
continue for the term
after the death
the last survivor
ten persons” named, six
whom were the sons and daughters
the other four, three
whom
trustees;
any
were
but
time
vote
2/3
the outstanding
meeting called for the purpose, confirmed by the vote
shares
terminated, and the property
5/7
the trustees, the trust can
distributed,
sold and proceeds distributed.”
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for it is a maxim
So too if there is
the office. of the
to keep up the
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that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee.”
not a special conﬁdence in the person, instead of in
trustee, no additional conveyances are necessary
succession of powers, rights and duties in the

trustees?"

A

little care in the drawing up the trust instrument

the trust as convenient in this regard as the

may make

corporation?"

This brings us to a consideration of the corporation and trust
Here are important differences, in theory,
obligations and liabilities.
and great care is necessary in drawing trust agreements or there is
danger of unexpected or unusual liabilities.
Corporation

It results,
person in the
those of any
except when
convenience,

Liabilities.

of course, that because a corporation is a separate
law, that its rights and obligations are its own, and not
And this doctrine obtains universally
other persons.
this corporate personality is used to “defeat public
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.”"°

It follows of course that if the corporation is properly organized,
and the shareholders and officers do all they should do, and do
nothing they should not do, no one is liable except the corporation
The theory is that the creditor must
for any obligations incurred.
look to the capital stock of the corporation for his protection; and
this capital stock is frequently called a “trust fund” for the protec
tion of creditors?”
Yet this trust fund doctrine has been bitterly
assailed, and it is held there is no liability on olﬁcers and share
holders, in the absence of statutory provisions, unless there is
actual or constructive fraud, or ultra vires, or tortious or illegal acts
Of course it is agreed that if there is a trust
upon their part?“
fund, it is peculiar, unlike ordinary trust funds, since there is no
2" Reichert v. Mission etc. Coal Co. (1907) 231 Ill. 238, 121 Am. St. R. 307; Dodge
v. Dodge (1908) 109 Md. 164, 71 Atl. 519, 13o Am. St. R. 503, note 508; Smith v.
Davis (1891) 90 Cal. 25, 25 Am. St. R. 92; U. S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer (1902) 169
Mo. 301, 69 S. W. 370, 92 Am. St. R. 641.
2" Kadis v. Weil (1913) 164 N. C. 84, 80 S. E. 229. Compare Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Safe Deposit Co. (1911) 115 Md. 339, Ann. Cas. 1913 A 1279, note.
"5 See Forms given in Sears, Cook (Corp. 7th Ed.), Conyngton (Corp. Organ.).
21'Smith v. Moore (1912)
199 Fed. 689. See also 10 Mich. Law Rev. 310; 12 Col.
Law Rev. 496.
“Wood v. Dummer (1824) 3 Mason 308, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1847; Scovill v. Thayer
(1881) 105 U. S. 143, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1907; Shields v. Hobart (1903) 172 Mo. 491, 95
Am. St. R. 529, 72 S. W. 669.
’1‘O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer (1894) 106 Ala. 205, 54 Am. St. R. 31, 2 Wilgus,
Cases, 1852; Hospes v. Northwestern
Mfg. Co. (1892) 4,8 Minn. 174, 2 Wilgus, Cases,
1911; Hall v. Henderson (1900) 134 Ala. 455, 63 L. R. A. 673.
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separation of the legal and equitable titles, and no special trusts and
confidence existing between the corporation, corporate officers, or
shareholders, and corporate creditors.
The corporation owns the
whole title legal and equitable to corporate property and the creditor
has, merely as such, no lien upon it either at law or in equity, at
least before insolvency.” And so it is held by the great weight of
authority (in the absence of bankruptcy laws forbidding) that a
corporation can lawfully prefer
creditors, even stockholder and
chooses, and there
director creditors,
no actual fraud.”
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capital stock,
Nevertheless
fund designated capital,
and
that only, that créditors can look for protection.
There
exactly what
however much confusion
included
this
perhaps can now
safely said
fund.
include all the corporate
property, real, and personal, tangible and intangible, choses
possession and
action,
amount equal
the face value
the outstanding stock, but yet not
that extent,
the corporate
capital has been dissipated
misfortune, and not
fault
re
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holding shareholders
There
however yet some uncertainty
unpaid
stock,
liable for
for stock issued for overvalued property,
corporate capital.
for dividends paid out
New York has just held that under the law
that state share
pay up their stock, can
holders
the absence
an agreement
pay up.” As
payment
not
held by creditors
stock by
property, one line
authorities holds that
the absence
actual
fraud, established
the complainant, the judgment
the direc
final,”
tors
where the three dummy incorporators and direc
tors holding $3,000
stock
the U.
Steel Corporation, under
the New Jersey law passed
resolution that the property proposed
turned over
the company was equal
value
the face
value
the stock and bonds, $1,410,000,000
issued for

think there was $700,000,000
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Another view
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Wilgus, Cases, 1868.
Brierfield Coal Co. (1893) 150 U.
Eagle Bank (1826)
Wilgus, Cases, 1815; Corey
Conn. 233,
Wads
Wilgus, Cases, 1836. Compare Rouse
worth (1897) 118 Ala. 488,
Merchants Natl.
493,
644, Wilgus, Cases, 1819; Olney
Bank (1889) 46 O.
Am. St.
Conanicut
597,
767,
Wilgus, Cases, 1832.
Land Co. (1889)
Am. St.
Ferguson (1913)) 66 Ore. 417, 134 Pac. 1029; In
Am. Life and Acc. Ins. Co.
Wells Estate (1913) 156 Wis. 294, 144 N. W. 174.
Morgan (1912) 205 N. Y. 293.
Southworth
Wilgus, Cases, 1950.
Graves
Brooks (1898)
Mich. 424,
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another rule is that a large difference in the actual value of the
property and the face value of the stock issued is prima facie evi
dence of fraud and calls for explanation;” and still another view
is that if the corporation is a “going concern,” but nearly “gone,”
stock may be issued at a discount to takers in order to see, if per
chance, it may be revived, at the expense of subsequent creditors.”
So, too, while it was originally held that the directors could not pay
dividends to shareholders out of the corporate capital, yet our Su
preme Court has held that where shareholders receive such dividends
in good faith, supposing they were properly declared and paid out of
profits instead of capital they may keep them,” and the creditor
must whistle through the corporate whistle to the defaulting direc
tors to make good their loss.
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Then too there are statutory efforts to protect creditors, which
for the most part are satisfactory to nobody. These are attempts
to make officers and stockholders liable for corporate debts under
such varying circumstances that it is difficult to tell what the liability
secondary,”, limited
contractual,” primary
whether penal
existing,
subsequent
joint,
prior,
unlimited, separate
on
shareholders,” and whether enforceable outside of the state or
stock
So too many states provide that all “fictitious issues
giving
great
difficulty
void,”
yet
courts
have
had
bonds shall
dis
issue stock
the effort
such provisions, for
effect
any
void, the statute would then hurt creditors more than
count
On the other
other way, and defeat its own probable purpose.”
issued
statute that provides that stock may
hand Montana has
to

be

to

wholly paid

* See cases cited
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Trust Liabilities.
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(a) Trustees liability: As has been pointed out, in a Trust, the
trustees are the owners of the property to the extent of any estate
necessary for them to have under the instrument of trust to enable
them fully to execute
therefore gives
them full control,
management, and disposition
the property, they acts
owners
do,
principals and not
agents
others.”
would naturally
follow from this that they bind themselves personally and themselves
alone,
the absence
some provision
the contrary. The debts
they incur are their personal debts, not those
the beneficiaries,
nor of the trust fund.*
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Loring, Trustees Handbook, pp. 25-29; Ames, Cases, 2d Ed., pp. 278-281; Ken
meson, Cases, pp. 147-152.
Loring,
Spangenberg (1910) 121
Trustees Handbook, pp. 29-31; Dunlevie
299, 66 Misc. 354.
N. Y.
Taylor
330, 335.
Davis (1884) 11o U.
63, note 67; Connally
Johnson
Leman (1890) 131 Ill. 609,
Am. St.
McIntyre
Lyons (1891)
664,
935;
Tex.
Am. St.
Williamson (1900)
Vt. 183,
47 Atl. 786, 82 Am. St. R, 929.
Roger Williams Natl. Bank
504; Mitchell
Groton Mfg. Co. (1889)
Co.
Whitlock (1897) 121 N.
166.
Hill, Trustees (Ed. 1846)
533; Woddrop
Weed (1893) 154 Pa. St. 307, 35 Am.
529; Curry
St.
832. But see Wright
Railroad Co. (1909) 151 N.
Dorr (1912)
21o Mass. 430, on 432.
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Taylor
States Supreme Court
agent contracts
the name
his principal,
bound, but the agent
the principal contracts and
not. When
such, unless he
trustee contracts
bound no one
bound for
has no principal.
The trust estate cannot promise; the contract
therefore the personal undertaking
the trustee. As
trustee
holds the estate, although only with the power and for the purpose
managing
personally bound
the contracts
makes
trustee, even when designating himself
such.
Of course
good faith for the benefit
when
trustee acts
the trust
indemnity himself for his engagements out
entitled
the estate
his hands.” As for instance where
broker secured
loan for
the trustee for the benefit
the estate, the trustee promising
pay the commission out
the trust fund,
was held that the trust
estate was not liable, but the trustee was personally.”
And
Trustee, was taken
where
note signed
the payee with
knowledge that
was for the benefit
the estate, yet the trustee
was held personally liable.”
Hill on Trustees states the rule “A
trustee who carries on any trade with the trust assets for the benefit
responsible
the cestuis que trust will
the creditors, not only
the extent of the trust assets but also with the whole of his own

As was said
Davis,” “When
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property, and he may be made bankrupt and proceeded against in the
same manner as any other trader, and it is immaterial that the trade
is carried on by him in consequence of an express direction in the
trust instrument; although the trust property will doubtless be
primarily liable to creditors, and will be first applied so far as it
will go in discharge of the liabilities.”

This of course is directly contrary to the liability of corporate
directors, and is so different that, if it could not be modified it would
deter competent business men from accepting such trusts. Can a
trustee then exclude such liability by express stipulation to the con

trary? It is clear he can. In Shoe and Leather Bank v. Wood,”
it was held that there was not personal liability upon the trustees
where they had executed a note reading “We as Trustees but not
individually promise to pay,” signed by themselves “Trustees;” and
it is ruled, in the words of the syllabus in Hussey v. Arnold, “No

as

to

of

all

action can be maintained against trustees, holding the property of
an unincorporated association, on a contract made by them which
by its terms is enforceable only against the property held in trust.”
This has been more recently affirmed.”
Upon the stationery of the Massachusetts Gas Companies, printed
in red ink, there appears the following, “The name ‘Massachusetts
Gas Companies
is the designation of the Trustees for the time
being under an agreement and declaration of trust, dated 1902, and
persons dealing with the Massachusetts Gas Companies must
any claim
look solely
the Trust property for the enforcement
against the Companies,
Trustees,
neither the
Officers nor share
holders assume any personal liability for obligations entered into
or

of

it

or to be

of
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or

be

to

or

to

of

be

or

is

it

In

the Companies.”
the Old South Building Trust
obliga
provided
every
deed
that “In
written order, contract
tion which the Trustees shall give, authorize
enter into,
shall
stipulate
stipulated that
the duty
the Trustees
cause
any personal
neither the Trustees nor shareholders shall
held
obligation.”
liability under
reason
such order, contract
on behalf

*

Conyngton,

Corporate Organization,

pp. 548, 556.
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246, 251.
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* 123 Mass. 148 (1877).
* 185 Mass. 202 (1904).
* King Stowell (1912) 211 Mass.
* Sears, Trust Estates etc., 320.
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some
the older cases the exemption
the trustee from per
subrogation
sonal liability was placed upon the right
the
indemnity, and
creditor
the trustees right
that alone;
that
the trust estate was insolvent,
the trustee exceeded his

authority the trustee was still personally liable. Perhaps he still is
in the latter case, but not in the former.”
But how about the liability of the beneficiaries? This depends
apparently upon whether they are really and truly, and individually,
beneficiaries only, of an existing trust, or whether they are assoc
ciated together in such a way as in fact to be partners engaged in
business for profit, the trustees being not really the owners of the
property, but in substance and truth the agents of the associated
beneficiaries. There has been much consideration given to these
matters in Massachusetts.
Hoadley v. Commrs,” the question was whether transferable
shares in a trust were taxable as corporate shares would be, i.e., at
the domicile of the owner, or where the trust property was located.
Held, the latter, since they were shares in a partnership. Here the
parties had “associated themselves to hold property and carry on
business,” “as the McKay Sewing Machine Association,” but no
member was to have any power to make any contract or transact
any business for the Association, which was itself to be the equit
able owner, and “the general management of the business” was
“vested in an executive committee * * * to be chosen by the
whole body of shareholders at a meeting called by the trustee for
that purpose.”
McKay,”
In Gleason v.
the same Association was involved, and
the question was whether the Association should be taxed upon all
its outstanding shares, as corporations were taxed. It was held not,

In

on the ground it was a partnership, without any corporate franchise,
and so not subject to the tax.
In Whitman v. Porter,” subscribers associated themselves to
gether to buy a ferry boat to be conveyed to one in trust, to be
managed by trustees and officers elected annually by subscribers,
who were to have transferable shares for their interests in the
“Agawam Ferry Co.;" the plaintiff in the case was one of the share
holders, who had advanced money to pay notes given for the pur
chase of the boat and to pay expenses and asked for contribution
from the others, over and above their subscriptions to pay the
Held, it was substantially a partnership, and “as
amount due.
between themselves they were ultimately liable in proportion to their
interests. But as to creditors, each was liable for the whole.”

* Sears, Trust Estates, p. 4o et seq.;
* 105 Mass. 519 (1870).
* 134 Mass. 419 (1883).
* 107 Mass. 522 (1871).

Loring,

Trustees Handbook, p. 35.

In Phillips
business of
under deed
a board of
were to be

v. Blatchford,” money was raised to carry on the
manufacturing grates, by sale of transferable certificates
of trust providing the business was to be carried on by
managers of whom the trustee was one, and the others
elected by the shareholders.
Held to be a partnership.

Am. Loan & Trust Co.,” another tax case, it was
held that where those who provided the money for purchasing and
selling cars, to be paid for in ten payments with six per cent interest,

In Ricker

V.

were declared to be an Association with the interests represented
by transferable shares, the business to be managed by a board of
managers named, subject to removal by the shareholders and others
to be elected by them, the title of the property being taken in in
trust by an incorporated trust company, a partnership was created,
subject to taxation as other partnerships.
So too, in William v. Boston,” where a trust was organized to
purchase the site of the Museum of Fine Arts, to be held by trustees,
who should issue transferable shares to the subscribers, in whom
in meeting assembled, was vested the power to instruct the trustees
or remove them, and to alter or amend the declaration of trust, and
to direct the trustees to sell the property, and although the deed
specifically stated that neither the shareholders nor the trustees were
to be personally liable for any obligations of the Trust, yet it was
stated that a partnership for taxation purposes was created.
In
the later case of Williams v. Milton (infra)
mistake, it was a trust and not a partnership.

it was said this was a

On the other hand in Mayo v. Moritz,” an inventor transferred
his invention to trustees, who were to issue to him one-half of a
specified amount of scrip or transferable shares, the other half to
be issued to subscribers who should furnish the trustees with money
for carrying on the business. The Trustees were to hold, manage
and dispose of the invention, as they thought best, and vacancies
among trustees were to be filled by the remaining trustees, held this
did not constitute a partnership.
The same view is taken in the still more recent case of JWilliams
v. Milton.”
This is also a taxation case. The Massachusetts
statute provides that personal property held in trust, shall be taxed
to the trustee where the beneficiary resides; and partners shall be
jointly taxed in the firm
** 137 Mass. 510 (1884).
346 (1885).
497 (1911).
481 (1890).
1 (1913).

* 14o Mass.
* 208 Mass.
* 151 Mass.
* 215 Mass.

name,

where the business is done; the

business was done in Boston

which

sought to tax the Trust: as a

partnership doing business there.
The trust deed creating this Boston Personal Property Trust,
“expressly declared that a trust, and not a partnership is hereby
created; that neither the Trustees nor the cestuis que trustent shall
ever be personally liable hereunder as partners or otherwise, but
that for all debts the Trustees shall be liable as such to the extent
of the Trust Fund only. In all contracts or instruments creating
liability it shall be expressly stipulated that the cestuis que trustent
shall not be liable.”
"The Trustees shall have as full power and discretion, as if abso
lute owners, to invest and reinvest the Trust Fund, in personal
property,” to borrow money to extent of 25 per cent of property and
pledge as collateral security any personal property belonging to the
Trust Fund; to declare dividends in their discretion; to render an
annual account; to resign,—vacancies
to be ﬁlled by remaining
trustees; to issue transferable certiﬁcates; to alter, add to or termin
ate the trust with the consent of three-fourths
in interest of the
cestuis que trustent.
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The court by LoR11~:o,
said: “VVhere persons associate them
selves together to carry on business for their mutual proﬁt, they are
none the less partners because (I) their shares in the partnership
are represented by certiﬁcates which are transferable and transmis
sible, and because (2) as
matter of convenience (if not of neces
sity in case of transferable and transmissible certiﬁcates) the legal
title to the partnership property
taken in the name of
third
person. The person in whose name the partnership property stands
in such
case
sense
trustee. But speaking with
perhaps in
an agent who for the principal’s convenience holds
accuracy he
the legal title to the principal’s property.
After reviewing the Massachusetts cases above referred to, the
court points out that the difference between the partnership cases,
(the Hoadley, lVhitman, Gleason, Phillips, Ricker and Williams
cases), on one hand and Mayo v. Moritz (the patent case) on the
other, lies in the fact that in the former cases the certiﬁcate holders
are associated together by the terms of the “trust” and are the
principals whose instructions are to be obeyed by their agent who
for their convenience holds the legal title to their property.
The
their property.
property
They are the masters. \Vhile in Mayo
v. M orits on the other hand there
no association between the cer
tiﬁcate holders. The property
the property of the trustees and the
trustees are the masters.
All that the certiﬁcate holders in lllayo
v. Moritz had, was
right to have the property managed by the
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trustees for their benefit. They had no right to manage it themselves
nor to instruct the trustees how to manage it for them.” The court
emphasizes that the only power the shareholders had was to consent
to an alteration of the trust deed, but they had no power to direct
or force the trustees to take any action. “It is the trustees, not the
certificate holders, who are the masters of the trust property.”
Similar or even more liberal views have been taken by other
courts. The leading case on what constitutes a partnership is Co."
v. Hickman, decided by the House of Lords in 1860.” In this case
failing merchants assigned all their assets to trustees to carry on the
business under the name of the company, for the benefit of creditors,
with their consent, the deed of trust authorizing the creditors to
accept the resignation of the trustees, appoint new ones, alter the
trusts or direct the business to be discontinued.
The trustees in
curred liabilities.
Held the trustees were not the agents of the
creditors, and they were not liable as partners. There was perhaps
no association here, although something like a composition among
the creditors.

Very similar to the facts of Co. v. Hickman, is the well con
sidered case of Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Grover.
Here by
a deed of trust made by a debtor to a trustee the latter was to convert
the property into money to pay the debtor's debts, make new pur
chases and carry on the business if he thought best.
The creditors
consented to this. The creditors were sued by plaintiff for goods

sold to the trustee because he was authorized to make such pur
chases to keep up the stock. It was held, on demurrer, that neither
the original debtor, nor the creditors were liable because no power of
control was reserved over the trustee, and he was not the agent of
the debtor nor the creditors. The trustee and the estate only were
liable.

In the English case of Smith v. Anderson,” a deed of trust was
made between six persons as trustees and another who covenanted
for and on behalf of certain certificate holders, numbering over 20,
who had subscribed for the purchase by the trustees of various
shares in other companies, all of which had been transferred to the
trustees, who were to issue transferable certificates therefor, upon.
which 6 per cent interest was to be paid from profits; the trustees
were to make and change investments, if authorized by certificate
holders, who were to have an annual meeting to hear reports and

* 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 323.
* 7 N. D. 460 (1898), 41 L. R. A. 252, 75 N.
cantile Co. v. Aultman (1900) 9 N. D. 520.
* 15 Ch. D. 247 (1880).

W. 914. See also Wells-Stone

Mer

elect new trustees. Held there was no partnership, and the com
pany was not illegal because it had not organized under the English
Companies, act, which required every “company, association or
partnership” carrying on business for gain by such company, asso
ciation, or partnership, or by the individual members thereof, when
they exceed 20 in number, to be registered.
Held, it was not a
partnership or company that required registration, and that the
trustees were not agents of the shareholders, and that it was the
trustees and not the shareholders who carried on the business.
case of Johnson v. Lewis” was similar.
The trust deed of
was made between parties of the first part styled the trus
tees,” others of second part called “the Committee,” and others of
third part called “covenantees,” these latter were subscribers to a
fund to purchase municipal bonds, to be purchased by the committee,
and put into hands of the trustees in trust to manage.
The sub
scribers were to receive transferable certificates for their interests.
The court by CALDwELL,
held: the trustees were the legal owners
the trust property and the business
the trust was managed by
them; and the committee created
the deed for the benefit
the
certificate holders were strangers
each other and entered into

The

of
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between themselves, nor with

contract
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each other, and they were not therefore partners.
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railroad, extend the same, and
others were
line
purchased
them; they were
build another
coal lands
do
purchase said properties, and for
all acts necessary
construct
that purpose absolutely
control the property
constructed
fully
purchased
they were the absolute
all respects
owners thereof.
The enumeration
the specific powers was not
limiting
general
powers conferred upon the
construed
the

By the agreement the defendants (Gould
al.) con
purchase
they thought
tracted
the properties on such terms
the best obtainable, and, on the other hand, the subscribers agreed
pay the
with each other and with the defendants (Gould
al.)
amounts
their respective subscriptions from time
time
defendants,
called for
the latter, but they were
liable only
and then only
the amount
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managers.

Fed. 27 (1880).
209 N. Y. 419, 103 N.
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The court per curiam held, “We are
the opinion that under the
syndicate agreement the relation between the subscribers and the
720 (1913).

__58__
managers (the defendants, appellant) was not that of principal and
agent (though doubtless ﬁduciary) but that the managers them
selves became the principals in any contract which they might make."
There are many other cases to like effect. It seems therefore that
the usual personal liability of the trustees can be excluded by ex
press provision brought home to every one dealt with; the cestuis
que trust, are not partners if the ownership and control of the fund
are left with the trustees; and by express provision brought home
to a dealer the Trust Fund alone can be made liable for the obliga
tions of the trust.

I have‘ referred to the provisions relating to capital stock of a
corporation, and pointed out some of the discordant theories in
reference thereto.
It has been, in the main, a struggle between
persons on the one hand who have wished to capitalize visionary
prospective proﬁts before their dreams were in fact realized, and if
disaster came, to get out from under, with some one else in posses
sion of the hot air bag,“ and the State's effort on the other hand to
make the actual capital, in the beginning come up to the manifesto,
or supplement this by other liabilities that frequently work unneces
It certainly cannot be said
sary hardship upon honest businessf“
that the schemes so far devised have been satisfactory.
Upon the
one hand they have been insulﬁcient to accomplish their real purpose;
and upon the other, have been too inﬁexible and inelastic to en
courage. honorable and legitimate enterprise.
The careful investor
in shares has difficulty to ascertain from statements of capital stock
much that aids him in getting at real values, while the careless one
is almost certain to be misled.
The creditor also is in much the
same predicament.
The really careful investor or creditor, relies
not upon the capital stock statements but upon the actual property
and course of business of the particular institution?‘“ The Trust
for the most part proceeds upon a like theory. If one deals with
a Trust in reference to the Trust, it is made his duty in the absence of
express provisions

otherwise. and

if

he has notice that he must look

Trust property alone for security, to ascertain just what that
property is, without regard to any amount of nominal shares that
may be issued against it?“ In other words the shares, few or many,
have nothing particularly to do with the property, but are only the
to the

4""See dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Fuller in Handley v. Stutz (1891) 139
U. S. 417, 2 Wilgus, Cases, 1923, 1932.
*"Machen, A. W., "Do Corporation laws allow suﬁicient freedom to commercial
enterprise?" Maryland Bar Ass’n Report, 1909, pp. 78-98.
“See Cook, Corporations, 7th Ed. §§ 46-47.
"Kisch v. Tozier (1894) 143 N. Y. 390, 42 Am. St. R. 729, note 733.

rely upon their

investigation,

own

as

ing with individuals, that
knowledge and judgment.

is,

method of indicating aliquot parts of the fund for the convenience
of the owners. The investor and the creditor both are expected to
act as business men do, and are required to do, when they are deal
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the Atlantic Monthly,
short time ago, Mr.
corporations:
mentioned various disadvantages
tax, franchise
There are, said
(1) Taxation,—organization
continuing tax, property tax, transfer tax, foreign state tax, and
Federal tax, nearly all
which are now imposed upon corporations,
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and
addition thereto the shares
shareholders are frequently
taxed
the owner,
not
the creating state, certainly
him
when
lives
another state.” So, too, the franchise tax may
imposed
home, and another privilege tax
each
the states
where the corporation does business, and these may
and fre
quently are higher than domestic corporations
the same business
pay, for
corporation does business, other than interstate com
merce,
foreign state by sufferance, comity
called,—
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Burton,
E., Corporations and the State (1911); Stock Watering, W.
Corporations,
Pol. Sci. Q. 98-121 (1911); Capital
W. Wickercham,
(1909);
Harv. Law Rev. 319-338 (1909); Overcapitalization,
38 Natl. Corp. Rep.
Stockwatering,
(1908); Williams
Bench and Bar,
McClave (1914) 148 N. Y.
93.
Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, Victor Morawetz, 26 Harv. Law Rev.
729 (1913).
Blue Sky Laws,
A. Updike,
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 230-237 (1913); Alabama
Doyle (1914) 21o Fed. 173.
N. O. Transp. Co.
al.
seq. (1912), July).
11o Atl. Monthly,
Wilgus, Cases, pp. 1370-1391; Farrington
679,
Tennessee (1877) 95 U.
Wilgus, Cases, 1370.
Augusta
Wilgus, Cases, 1480;
*Bank
Earle (1839)
Pet. (38 U. S.) 519,
Wilgus, Cases, 1498, note
Manchester Fire Ins. Co.
Herriott (1899)
Fed. 711,
1502.
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Different people will take different views
the best policy,
Recently New York has provided for the issue
this regard."
corporate shares without par value, and has recognized the duty
rely upon his own judgment, instead
investor and creditor alike
upon the uncertain meaning
fixed capital stock.”
The
efficiency and validity
sky
blue
laws are yet “in nubibus,” and
make corporate capitalization still more intricate,—and cloudy.”
inspecting corporate books
While the right
shareholders
now generally recognized, without any actual controversy being in
Trusts, can
fully recognized
volved, such right,
the case
regulated
provisions,
stautory
the trust deed
the
common
corporations.
law rules permit
the case

—i®-i_

I

but here the ﬁction that personal property follows the owner, is
often applied much more rigorously to corporations than to indi
viduals.
Shares are also subject to an inheritance tax, in the state
where the deceased lived, in the state where the corporation is in
corporated, and according to some decisions also where the shares
are to be transferred.
The transfer tax can be imposed wherever
the transfer is to be made?” The Federal tax is now an income
tax, and of course would apply to the income of a Trust as well as
a corporation.
The Supreme Court however held that the income
tax of 1909, applied only to such associations “as are organized
under some statute, or derive from that source some quality or
beneﬁt not existing at the common law,” and Trusts were not so
organized and have no such quality.“ In Massacliusetts after much
variety of opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court has ﬁnally ruled that
can be subjected to an excise tax under their
these institutions
constitution, similar to corporations?"
Trust property is usually
taxed only to the trustee, who may indemnify
trust estate.
:

himself

out of the

Mr.

STF.Ts0N points out also (2) that corporations are not protect
ed under the 4th and 5th amendments as natural persons are, with
special reference to divulging incriminating information, discrimina
tion against them, as to terms of doing business, and enforcing
claims. So also under the reserved power to repeal or amend cor
porate charters, many limitations and restrictions upon a corpora
tion’s power to contract can be and are imposed that would not be
valid if imposed upon citizens of the United States?" So a foreign
corporation as a creditor, unless it has entered a state and complied
with its laws in reference to doing business in the state, is not a
person within the jurisdiction, so as to be protected under the
m Morrison v. Manchester (1879) 58 N. H. 538; -Fowler v. Campbell 100 Mich.
398; City of Detroit v. Lewis, 109 Mich. 155, 32 L. R. A. 439; Mills v. Thornton, 26
Ill. 300, 79 Am. Dee. 377; Matzenbaugh v. People, 194 Ill. 108, 88 Am. St. R. 134;
Latrobe v. Mayor, 19 Md. 13; Corry v. Baltimore, 96 Md. 310, 196 U. S. 466, 25 S. C.
297; Tappan v. Merchants’ Bank, 19 Wall (U. S.) 490; Merriman's Estate, 147 Mich.
630; Estate of Palmer, 183 N. Y. 238; In re Ames Estate (1913) 141 N. Y. S. 793:
People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168; Matter of Cooley, 186 N. Y. 220.
*7’ Eliot v. Freeman (1911) 220 U. S. 178.
*7‘ In re Opinion of Justices (1908) 195 Mass. 607, 84 N. E. 490; In re Opinion of
Justices (1911) 208 Mass. 616, 94 N. E. 1043; Compare S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v.
Co1nmw. (1912) 212 Mass. 35, 98 N. E. 1056 (Corp.); Keystone Watch Co. v. Commw.
(1912) 212 Mass. 50, 98 N. E. 1063 (Corp.); Farr Alpaca Co. v. Commw. (1912) 212
Mass. 156, 98 N. E. 1078 (Corp.); Baltic Min. Co. v. Commw. (1913) 231 U. S. 68,
34 S. C. 15.

':"State v. Nashville etc. Ry. Co. (1911) 124 Tenn.
D. 805; Hale v. Henkel (1906) 201 U. S. 43; Wilson
McGuire v. Railway C0. (1906) 131 Ia. 340.
\

1, 135 S. W. 773, Ann. Cas. 1912
v. U. S. (1911) 221 U. S. 361;
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almost all these
particulars, trustees being citizens
the United States and entitled
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citizens
the several states,
corporation.” So too many
protected more fully than
would
states attempt
exclude corporations doing business
the state
suing
from
the Federal courts, and while they cannot actually
exclude them from the Federal Courts, they may oust the offending
corporation from the state.”
Mr. STETSON also points out (3) the very great and unjust toll that
paid
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the beginning that one
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crying weaknesses
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more than probable that
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Toward the public, however, this may
experience that all
great
our
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Trusts, under
bad, have almost without exception originated
describing;”
Trust deeds such
we have been
and from this form,
Appeals,
held
the New York Court
the Sugar Trust” case
illegal
partnership contrary
corporation
the right
such, and by the Supreme Court
member
Ohio
the
Standard Oil Case
be an institution
unlawful restraint of
trade,” those who then saw the handwriting on the wall fled
hope
find legal shelter
the corporate form, only
find their
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hope in vain.” Neither trust nor corporate form where restraint
of trade is the end of the organization, can stand the searching
power of the government to destroy either under the common law
or under the anti-trust acts.”
Massachusetts has through Commissioners made investigations of
these Express Trusts, and after two reports, enacted legislation pro
viding for the filing with the Railroad Commission of
deeds
trust for such Associations, and
the case
Trusts for owning
railway, street railway and electric railway companies,
shares
which are managed
the same parties, making annual reports to,
making
subject
and
them
examination by, the Railroad Commis
given also
sion. The same power
the Gas Commission
gas, electric light, and power companies.
reference
accurate,
the foregoing review
would seem that, largely
because
the variety, uncertainty, and confusion arising from con
flicting legislative provisions, the Trust form
organization,
upon
private
simple,
certain,
side,
least
the
more
consistent and
yet flexible, and perhaps with even more satisfactory safeguards
available both
the investor and the creditor, than
the corpora
tion.
so
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direct personal responsibility toward the
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whole
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inherently
difference. The psychology
the group mind seems
single individual.
different from that
will seek and accomp
lish ends from which individuals will shrink. As the non-explosives,
glycerine, nitric and sulphuric acids and saw-dust mixed, make the
explosive dynamite,
does the combination
the intelligent, the
stupid, the selfish and unselfish, the honest and the dishonest, into
one group, give
resultant that when quiescent usually does much
better than the worst, yet from hidden powers often does much
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laws, more simple, certain and ﬂexible; and a
properly worked out Federal incorporation law would help corpora
tions with extensive business in many respects, and furnish a model
for state legislation.
\V hen laws are uncertain, or unduly hamper legitimate enterprise,
bright minds will invent methods to accomplish unexpected ends.
In the early years of our history, there was great prejudice against
the incorporation of banks, and there were either no laws permi-tting
it or if there were any, they were such as were diﬁﬁcult to comply
with. The brilliant services of Alexander Hamilton, and of Aaron
Burr were called in requisition to devise plans for the institution of
banks in New York City. Hamilton drew up a masterly paper which
with a few words changed—directors
to trustees, shareholders to
beneﬁciaries, and a few others, would still be a model form for a
Trust for business purposes, such as we have been considering, and
which was the constitution of the Merchants Bank for 20 years, until
the legislature forbade banking in any but the corporation form.
On the other hand Aaron Burr engineered a bill through the New
York legislature to incorporate a company to supply the city of New
York with water, and with authority to use its surplus capital “in
any way not inconsistent with the laws and constitutions of the
United States and New York.” Under this charter, so it is stated,
the Manhattan Bank has been carrying on business for I15 years?“

our corporation

as
These perhaps are typical illustrations
called upon to‘ do, and the methods sometimes
statesman-like, constructive, and within the
statesman-like, destructive, and if within the
taking advantage of its uncertainty, to thwart

to what lawyers are
resorted to. The one
law.
The other un
law at all, only so by
the expressed

will of

the people.
Perhaps these things can never be wholly overcome until men are
made over. All production is the result of the combination of forces
within man, with forces and ‘things outside him, of persons and
From the beginning of time some men in whom the
property.
sense of brotherhood
was latent or unborn. have always classed
men as external things to be used or exploited as other
property, and have considered it proper to take all that their
strength, their wit or their cunning enabled them to take; others
have believed that they should take no more from the common
fund than they had contributed to it; still others that they should
contribute to it all their ability and their skill would enable them to
other

'-*"Hamilton's \Vorks,
""“ Century Magazine,

vol. 7, pp. 838-844; Scars, Trust Estates, etc., p. 341.
May, 1899; Parton's Life of Burr, p. 238.

do, and take from it only what they needed.
There is no doubt but
that the trend of the ages has been practically from the first of these
toward the second, and perhaps in the more recent years of the
Christian era, there has been a trend ideally at least, if not much
practically, toward the third.
As one or the other of these ends
are dominant so will the nature and the administration of the laws
be. And so will the institutions founded upon them be.
But none
will be perfect until men are perfect.
H. L. WILGUs.
University of Michigan.
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